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IV

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In her Brief (filed on or about July 19, 2006), Plaintiff Appellee/Cross-Appellant
(hereinafter, "Plaintiff) combined her response to Defendants'/Appellants' (hereinafter,
"Defendants") Brief and her own principal Brief which presents several new issues. This
Reply Brief will serve as a reply to Plaintiffs response to Defendant's principal Brief and
will also address the new enumerated issues raised by Plaintiff in her Brief. Issues I
through III are those issues initially raised by Defendants in their principal Brief to which
Plaintiff responded. Issues IV through VIII are new issues raised by Plaintiff in her July
19, 2006 Brief.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DETERMINE WHICH
STATUTE OF LIMITITATIONS VERSION GOVERNED THE CASE
A.

The Defendants Preserved This Issue For Appeal.

In Utah, "when a defendant fails to object to jury instruction at trial, [Utah
appellate courts] will consider an alleged error on appeal only where it falls into the
category of plain error." State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 178 (Utah App. Ct. 1992).
Although the plain error rule is commonly used in criminal appeals, Utah courts have also
applied the same rule in civil appellate matters. See Diversified Holdings, L.C., v. Turner,
63 P.3d 686, 692-93 (Utah 2002) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 51(d) and stating that "unless a
party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not
be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice...[This] rule applies in both
criminal and civil contexts."). In the instant case, the Court may properly review the issue
of whether the trial court erred when it submitted questions of law to the jury because

such error falls within the plain error rule and a review of such issue an is necessary to
avoid a manifest injustice.
Neither party in the instant matter dispute the fact that the contract for the sale of
the home at issue closed no later than May 2, 1994. Furthermore, both parties agree that
Plaintiffs did not file their Complaint until August 24, 2000. According to the law applied
by the trial court (as evidenced by Jury Instruction No. 31) [Jury Instruction No. 31 is
attached to Defendants' Brief, Addendum "19], "Utah law provides that an action for
construction defect based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within six years of
the closing of the sale of the house."
Jury Instruction No. 31 also contains the following language: "Utah law provides
that an action for fraudulent nondisclosure shall be commenced within two years of the
time that Plaintiffs discovered their cause of actions for fraudulent nondisclosure or the
date upon which such cause of action should have been discovered through reasonable
diligence." Jury Instruction No. 31 also states that "Plaintiffs filed their suit on August
24, 2000."
Given the undisputed facts that the home at issue closed on or before May 2, 1994
and that Plaintiffs did not file their suit until August 24, 2000, the trial court erred by
requesting the jury to make a determination concerning the statute of limitations on
Plaintiffs' contract claims. The trial court committed plain error by submitting the statute
of limitations question to the jury because on its face, the court's own instruction barred
all of Plaintiff s contractual claims. Moreover, because the jury was not instructed to
determine an accrual date for Plaintiffs causes of action (a question of fact), the legal
2

conclusion by the jury that Plaintiffs Fraudulent Nondisclosure claims were not barred is
unsupported.
Review of the trial court's error is essential to avoid the manifest injustice caused
by a complete disregard for obvious facts and applicable law. Without review, Defendants
will be denied the proper protection afforded by Utah law and will be forced to pay a
$30,680.00 judgment, and at least $50,000.00 in attorney's fees and costs despite the
clear fact that Plaintiff did not file any of her claims until more than six years from the
closing of the sale of the house. Given that the home was sold to Plaintiff and her
husband for only $83,000.00, Defendants have suffered a manifest injustice in being
required to pay Plaintiff $80,680.00 (nearly the entire cost of the home itself).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should hold that the trial court did commit
plain error and that failure to review such error will result in a manifest injustice, thereby
providing proper grounds for the Court to review the instant matter.
B.

The Trial Court Erred In Failing to Correctly Determine the
Appropriate Version of the Relevant Statute of Limitations.

In a case where the central issue is whether the cause of action is barred by
operation of a statute of limitations, it is of primary importance to establish, through a
finding of fact, the approximate date on which the cause of action accrued.
"A cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes when a reasonable
person knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of both the
injury and its governing cause." Matson v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 240 F.3d 1233,
1235 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). "'Generally, a cause of action accrues upon the

3

happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.'" Spears v, Warr,
2002 UT 24, \ 33, 44 P.3d 742 (quoting Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah
1996)) (other internal quotations and citations omitted).
The general requirement that the appropriate fact-finder in a case establish an
approximate date as to when a cause of action accrued is doubly pressing in the case
because (as explained in Defendants' initial Brief), several versions of the relevant statute
of limitations provisions existed between the time that Plaintiff and her husband
purchased the house in 1994 and when they finally filed their suit over six years later.
As fully detailed in Defendants' initial Brief, application of the appropriate
version of the relevant statutory provision will determine whether Plaintiffs claims (both
in contract and tort) should be barred by the statute of limitations.
Defendants are not confused as to which version of the statute of limitations
should apply. Defendants' believe (and the trial court intimated) that Plaintiffs claims
were all reasonably discoverable at the time the earnest money sales agreement
("EMS A") was executed (on February 15, 1994). If this is the case, then the "accrual"
date of Plaintiff s causes of action was February 15, 1994 and, accordingly, the 1991
version of the statute of limitations should have applied. Application of that version
would have barred all of Plaintiff s claims. As discussed below, Plaintiff is not entitled to
rely upon an equitable tolling argument—however, even if equitable tolling did apply, an
accrual date of February 15, 1994 would mean that any equitable tolling of the statue of
limitations would have ended on that same date.
It is important to re-emphasize that the statute of limitations, in all its variations,
4

demands that a specific date be determined as to when a cause of action accrues in order
for the appropriate version of the statute to apply.
In the instant case, the trial court failed to clearly establish, through a finding of
fact, the specific date on which Plaintiff and her husband discovered or should have
discovered the facts forming the basis for their causes of action. As a consequence of not
having determined the specific time frame on which to base its decisions of law, the trial
court committed reversible error.
The most obvious example of the trial court's error in applying the statute is
evidenced in the split ruling of its September 29, 2003 Order on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. In the Order, the lower court ruled that:
1.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in
part in accordance with the following.

2.

Plaintiffs admitted that all defects except defects 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38 and
39 were patent and not latent defects and could have been discovered by a
home inspection. (Court's decision at page 5.) In addition, the court
determines that defect items 12 and 38 are patent defects. Therefore, the
motion for summary judgment is granted regarding plaintiffs 'fraudulent
nondisclosure claims as to all defects except 9,11, 26, 27 and 39.

3.

This construction defect case is governed by the Utah Code Section 78-1221.5 of which subsection (3) (a) provides that an action by or against a
provider based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within six
years of the date of completion of the improvement (Decision at page 6.)
Subsection (3)(b) provides that all other causes of action against the
provider shall be commenced within two years of the discovery of a cause
of action or the date upon which a cause of action should have been
discovered through reasonable diligence. In accordance with UCA 78-1221.5 (3)(b) the discovery rule applies in this case. Plaintiffs have created
material issues of fact as to when such defects were first discovered and
therefore summary judgment as to such relief is denied. [See Defendants'
Brief, Addendum "9", emphasis added].

5

In analyzing the lower court's ruling, the emphasized segments clearly suggest that
the trial court actually premised its decision to dismiss the Fraudulent Nondisclosure
claim as to certain "patent" defects because they were discoverable by the process of a
home inspection. In ruling that some defects were patent and that those defects could
have been discoverable by a home inspection, the lower court made a ruling of law and
established the date on which the Plaintiff discovered or should have discovered defects
in the home.
In Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1390 (Utah App. 1994) this Court
emphasized:
The responsibility to observe patent, and any discoverable latent, defects falls
on the buyer of the home and is usually accomplished by hiring a
knowledgeable home inspector to scrutinize the home before finalizing a sale.
Oftentimes, however, real estate agents and sellers are understandably unaware
of latent defects in the home at the time of sale. This is an inherent risk
involved in purchasing a home.
As inferred from the foregoing language, a home inspection generally assists home
buyers in discovering both patent and latent defects. Accordingly, the trial court's focus
on the difference between "patent" and "latent" becomes less-relevant. What is important
is that both types of defects could have been discovered if a home inspection had been
undertaken at the time the Plaintiff and her husband purchased the home. Again, this is
highly important, because it establishes the accrual date for Plaintiffs claims.
It is noteworthy that Plaintiff utterly fails in its Brief to directly establish any point
at which the jury or the trial court determined an accrual date. Plaintiff tries to convince
this Court that the jury "obviously concluded that the Moores should not have reasonably
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discovered the footings defects before April of 2000." [See Plaintiffs Brief, pp. 11-12]—
yet such a conclusion is i low I: iei e to be foi md

: !|

" s disci issed hei einaftei ., all v ei sions of

U'.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 after 1991 distinguish between "contract/warranty" causes of action,
and all "other" types of causes of action. 1:\ en il the accrual date for the claims on the
!.>.>tw»^

hirjih

'v Anri! ^

,!i

Plaintiff s Breach of Contract claim would be

barred because the statue of limitations provides a strict period within which
contt act \ v at i: ant claims i:iia> be bi oi lght
C

. •

;

.

• .

The trial court erred m implying the Discovery Rule.

The trial court erred in applying the discovery rule to this case ana me rlaintiff is
incoi i e ::t it i h sr analysis of the applicability of the discovery rule.
Legislature has affirmatively left equitable discovery/tolling
out of the language of the U.C.A , § 78-12-21 5
The whole purpose for U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 is to provide a limit on actions related
to improvements in real property. Plaintiff has completely failed to grasp that in enacting
jgislati u e has all ead)r incoi poi ated a tolling prnod foi cei tain
causes of actions.
Plaintiff erroneously argues that the equitable discovery/tolling rule applies to
claims under U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5. All versions of the statute that might potentially apply
to this case, however, contain specific language that tolls the filing period until discovery
specifically removes the maximal filing period limit in cases where a provider (1) has
fraudulently concealed ......

r
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intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty.
The only interesting point of distinction is that in all versions after 1991, actions
for breach of contract or warranty are distinguished from other causes of action and are
specifically required to be filed within six years of the completion of the improvement or
abandonment of construction (unless otherwise provided for by express warranty or
contract).
The statute, in all variations, speaks for itself The Legislature has already
considered the tolling issue and embodied such considerations into the statute itself. The
Legislature has affirmatively left out any equitable discovery/tolling rule from the
contract/warranty component of the statute in all versions after 1991. If the Court did, in
fact, apply the 1999 version of the statute, Plaintiffs Breach of Contract claim was
clearly barred (inasmuch as it was not filed within six years from the date of completion
of construction). However, the same question arises: if Plaintiff s claims accrued in
1994, then which version of the statute should apply?
2.

Even if equitable tolling should be applied, the tolling period is
still is dependent upon the accrual date.

Before a trial court may properly apply the discovery rule to extend a statute of
limitations period, "an initial showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know or and
could not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action in time to file a
claim." Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). In fact, the entire
purpose of the discovery rule is to unsure that an applicable statute of limitations does not
begin to run until a party knows or should have known of the existence of a particular

8

cause of action. Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah

the running of the limitation period 'until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the
cause of action.

, ,..^. .n». citaikus onniteu).

V"Vitliout a specific determination as to the date on which Plaintiff and her husband
discovered or should have discovered the facts for forming the basis of their causes of
in liiiii |hr l i i ill

ml ! (iiiilliill iiiiiill \\\]\ v iipplii ill linn i l i s n n r n iiiilii1 ^ iilii ml i n m m i l l i m '

reversible error.
in this case, iiiw .ii^coverv

.L..-.

a.

JIIOHCOL

-^pncuneLdUH

;

,.rt

found that 35 of the defects were "patent" and therefore discoverable through a home
inspection prior to the purchase of the home. This is particularly significant, given that
•'•*»"< * •• • '

' •• *^ ••-','1 ""

"I1 -• -.i.^^iMiK^it J;onio inspection

in 2000. In other words, even if Plaintiff was entitled to invoke the doctrine of equitable

equitable tolling would terminate at the time she could have discovered both patent and
latent defects (i.e. via a home inspection piiui u> mc purchase of the home). Because no
.accrual date was ever precisely'determined, there is no way of knowing when Plaintiff's
equitable tolling period ended.

Till': liiiii rTRiNf in I

ill i il ,i rurroit \vv\

IFSINTIIISCASE.

As set forth in Defendants' initial Brief (pp. 32-25), the doctrine of caveat emptor
as elucidated by Utah courts appiu> ^ .,u iaUh m ti;;.-. case and bars Piaini
Contract and other tort claims.
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_ ^ ; ; ,-.

Plaintiffs were aware that they were buying the home in an "as is" condition, and
that the EMSA disclaimed all warranties and representations other than those found in
paragraph "C". The alleged defects were ultimately discovered by a non-destructive
inspection in 2000, and could have been discovered in similar fashion before the sale of
the home in 1994. Governing case law clearly establishes that Plaintiffs had a
responsibility to protect themselves by having the home inspected before the sale.
Plaintiffs did not have the home inspected before the sale; instead Plaintiffs failed to
exercise reasonable diligence, waiting until August, 2000 (over six years after purchasing
the home) to have it inspected. Paragraph "B" of the EMSA itself specifically provides:
Tf B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that
Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and
judgement and not by reason of any representation made to Buyer by
Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size,
location, present value, future value, income here from or as to its
production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to
Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event that Buyer
desires an additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by
Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs were clearly given every opportunity to perform their due diligence and
were put on notice of the home's status by the language of the EMSA. Plaintiffs did not
exercise ordinary due diligence to discover the alleged defects and, therefore, the doctrine
of caveat emptor precludes Plaintiffs from bringing suit for the alleged defects in the
home.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY SUBMITTED QUESTIONS OF
LAW TO THE JURY.
The trial court's special verdict questions to the jury as to whether "the statute of
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limitations barred or prohibited the Plaintiffs fraudulent non-disclosure claim" to the
dofr

erred not only in posing a legal question to the jury, but also erred in accepting the ruling
baset

.

- ie.-*p*>i;>c iv UIL ^U-.

If, indeed, Plaintiff was required to file her Breach of Contract claim within six
years from the date of closing (as indicated by Jury Instruction . -

uic jury

completely erred in gi anting judgment for Plaintiff; »n h/r Breach of Contract claim since
it is undisputed that the claim was filed more than six years after closing. As discussed in

to any other tort claims under U.C.A. £ 7K-12-21.5 because a tolling period is
incorporated in the statute's very language).
Similarly, thejury's legal conclusion that Plaintiffs Fraudulent Nondisclosure
claims as to the windows and footings were not barred by the statute of limitations is

1994.
I '

" FHE TRIAL COURT DID N O ! ERR IN GRANTING PAR i iAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO PI AINTIFF'S FRAUD! 1 ,FNT
NONDISCLOSURE CLAIM.
On appeal, a trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness.
• i'i<-*l f - "•

;

* * .' ir. \\i '

l

l

*•.--,*. neainst whom the

motion was granted. See Anderson \>. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, f 10, 108 P.3d 701.

1 This jury instruction is apparently is based oi: ..i.
11

*•• * rr^nn^, i .:i*_ >taun.e.

sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record even though that ground
or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling. Boud v. SDNCO,
Inc., 2002 UT 83, If 10, 54 P.3d 1131, (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260
(Utah 1998)).
As argued in the first three Sections of this brief and as set forth in Defendants'
brief-in-chief, Plaintiffs Fraudulent Nondisclsoure claim (as well as her other claims) is
barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by the doctrine of caveat emptor. In
other words, the partial dismissal of Plaintiff s Fraudulent Nondisclsoure claim as to 37 of
the 42 alleged defects was appropriate on statute of limitations and/or caveat emptor
theories in any case, and should be upheld.
Irrespective, the trial court correctly ruled in its Memorandum Decision on
Defendants' second Motion for Summary Judgment (filed August 21, 2003) [and attached
hereto as Addendum "1"] that: (1) all but five of the alleged defects were patent, (2) that
the Defendants' home was "used," and (3) that the doctrine of caveat emptor precluded
Plaintiffs fraudulent nondisclosure claims as to 37 of the 42 alleged defects.
Furthermore, the trial court did not "invade the province of the jury" as alleged by
Plaintiff in granting summary judgment as to defects No. 12 and 38. Finally, the Utah
Supreme Court has not abandoned the doctrine of caveat emptor as asserted by Plaintiff.
A.

The ruling of the trial court that all but five of the alleged defects were
patent, and thus disposable through Defendants' summary judgment
motion, was correct.

Plaintiff takes issue with the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
Defendants' favor on her fraudulent nondisclosure claim as related to 37 of the 42 alleged
12

defects in the home.

26, 27, 28, and 39 of the original 42 defects in the home were in fact not "latent''' or were
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that she was somehow compelled or forced to admit that 35 of the defects were "patent."
However, as discussed hereinafter, Plaintiff answered me requests for admissions in
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certain requests required Plaintiff to posit a legal conclusion. (R. 527-530). A review of
Defendants' Second Set of Requests for Admissions rexcais u-.ai i^cienuaiiLs asKcu,
among other things (11 whether each of the alleged 42 defects had actually been
discovered through inspection by a knowledgeable inspector and whether such discovery

time could have revealed each of the 42 alleged defects. (3) whether each of the 42
defects were "laten i . ^..,
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After an extension was allowed for Plaintiff, and after several requests by
Defendants that Plaintiff submit answers to the Second Set of Requests for Admissions,
Defendants filed a Motion v,- Sanctions, or in the Alternative to Compel Discovery. (R.
390).

the potential application of the statute of limitations and caveat emptor defenses to the
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case and also given that the EMS A itself disclaimed all warranties other than those listed
in paragraph "C."
The trial court ultimately required Plaintiff to answer. While Plaintiff correctly
notes that the trial court defined "latent" as "hidden," Plaintiff was not forced by the trial
court to admit anything. In fact, if Plaintiff could have simply denied that any or all of
the alleged defects were patent.
Plaintiffs reliance on case law and Black's Law Dictionary does not necessarily
prove that the trial court's definition of the term "latent" was incorrect or misleading.
Plaintiffs own reference to Hot v. University of Utah, 2000 UT App 286, 12 P.3d 1011 is
illustrative. In that case, this Court quoted Black's Law Dictionary in defining a "latent
defect" as "a defect which reasonably careful inspection will not reveal." Id. at f 18.
Although this definition is somewhat more specific than the definition provided by the
trial court ("hidden"), the two definitions are closely synonymous. More importantly, if
Plaintiff had reservations about the trial court's definition and wished to rely upon
Black's Law Dictionary as the standard definition for the terms "patent" and "latent," she
could have simply denied that any of the alleged defects were "patent."
On appeal, Plaintiff asks this Court to probe her internal subjective reasoning
concerning her understanding of the term "latent" at the time she answered the requests
and then to find that she was somehow misled by the trial court into admitting that 35 of
the defects were not "latent."
In the instant case, Plaintiff and her husband purchased an inexpensive home
for $83,000.00. Plaintiffs opted not to have an inspection done even though the
14

E M S A itself was rife with disclaimers as to warranties.

been discoverable in 1994 irrespective of whether the defects were patent or latent if a n
inspection h a d been obtained.
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of 35 defects that she admitted were "patent" were, in fact, "unobservable upon
reasonable inspection." Plaintiff m a d e a n admission as to the status of the alleged defects
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allegation that she was misled into mistaken admissions.
B

The trial court did not "invade the province of the jury' 5 in granting
summary judgment as to defects No. 12 and 38.

In addition to the 35 admittedly patent defects, the trial court granted summary
judgment as to defects No. 12 and 38. I he trial court: explained its rationale in the August
21, 2003 Memorandum Decision on Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment
as follows:
Additionally, the Court finds that the alleged defect item number 12, "no
smoke detectors in the bedrooms and the only smoke detector in the house is a
battery detector" to be an item that could have reasonably been discovered by
Plaintiffs. Likewise, alleged defect Item number 38 "insulation baffles to
allow ventilation at exterior walls" is an item that could have reasonably been
discovered by the Plaintiffs by observing there were not vents on the House in
the roof area. [See Addendum " l , " p . 6].
The trial court assessed that these two alleged defects were so reasonably
discouTiibli In, ll.'iitililViiiHl liri li
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trial court had been fully briefed on all of the facts prior to rendering its decision and
believed that this was a "clear case" in which summary judgment was appropriate. Hot at

1fl8.
C.

The trial court properly concluded that the Defendants' home was
"used."

Plaintiff takes issue with the trial court's reasonable conclusion that the
Defendants were selling a "used" home. In the August 215 2003 Memorandum Decision
on Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court cited Schafir v.
Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1389 (Utah App. 1994) as the standard for determining whether
the doctrine of caveat emptor could be invoked by Defendants. [Addendum " 1 , " p. 4].
The court then explained why Defendants' home was deemed "used:"
"[a] home inspection is not required when purchasing a new home because the
doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply. In this case, Plaintiffs did not
dispute that the Smiths lived in the Home or that the Smiths intended it to be
their home in their response to Defendants' first Motion for Summary
Judgment, therefore, it is an admission. The Court finds that the Home is a
used home because the Smiths intended it to be their home, they lived in the
Home for a short period of time, and Plaintiffs have admitted these facts. .
[Addendum " 1 , " pp. 4-5].
On appeal, Plaintiff attempts to persuade this Court that the home was not
"used"—this despite the undisputed fact that Defendants' lived in the home for a
period before selling it to Plaintiff and her husband.^ In an effort to create its own
legal definition of the term "used," Plaintiff postulates that because Defendants
only lived in the home for three weeks after the certificate of occupancy was
issued, the home should not have been considered "used."
2 Even Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendants lived in the home for a period before
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Plaintiff also argues that Defendants' never claimed that the home was "used."
[See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 33]. This assertion is absurd. Defendants and the trial court
obviously understood the common and generally accepted definition of the term "used"
given the context of this case. It is not necessary or remotely feasible for parties in
litigation to minutely define and claim ownership of a term when the facts sufficiently
provide a basis for a commonsense understanding of the term. Plaintiff is straining at
gnats.
A lengthy argument is made by Plaintiff that the trial court unfairly held Plaintiff
to a prior admission that Defendants built the home "for their own residence." [See
Plaintiffs Brief, pp. 31-32]. Plaintiff admits that she and her husband did not originally
contest Defendants' assertion that the home had been build for Defendants' residence.
[See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 31]. Nevertheless, Plaintiff explains that this admission was only
made in the context of the first summary judgment motion filed by Defendants in
February 2001. [See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 31]. After two years had elapsed, Plaintiff
apparently changed her mind for purposes of Defendants' second Motion for Summary
Judgment filed on May 6, 2003. In Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff and her husband denied that Defendants built the home for
their own residence. (R. 958). Plaintiff made no motion, oral or written, to formally
withdraw her prior admission that Defendants had built the home for their residence.
Furthermore, in the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiff relied upon her own deposition testimony in attempting to refute

selling it. [See Plaintiffs Brief, pp. 30-31].
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Defendants' contention that the home was built for their own residence. The problem is
that Plaintiff is merely offering her opinion as to Defendants" subjective intentions. How
do Plaintiff and Mr. Peterson know what the intentions of Defendants were in
constructing the home? Defendants dissect this problem in their Reply Memorandum in
support of summary judgment. [See Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 1-2, attached hereto as Addendum "2"].
Finally, Plaintiff warns that if this Court does not reverse the trial court's
categorization of the home as "used," then "it may become a customary habit for some
general contractors to live in a home a few short weeks and then sell it to an unsuspecting
buyer who thinks he is buying a "new" home, when in-fact, he may be buying a "used"
home in which the doctrine of caveat emptor applies." [See Plaintiffs Brief, pp. 31-32].
This is pure conjecture. More problematic, however, is that Plaintiff offers no clear-cut
alternative for trial courts who are attempting to determine whether a home is "used" or
not. Should this Court actually reverse the trial court, what standard should be imposed
for determining whether a home is "used?" Should a home be considered "used" if a
person lives in it for one month? Two months? Should the subjective intent of the
builder/owner be dispositive? Should other extrinsic questions of fact be explored (such
as whether the home was listed)?
In sum, the trial court's determination that the home was "used" was reasonable
and well-founded. The trial court relied upon a common understanding of the term and
upon the clear undisputed facts of the case. Plaintiffs revocation of her admission that
the home was intended by Defendants to be their residence (even if proper) is based only
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on her subjective opinion. Reversal of the trial court's determination on this issue is
unwarranted.
D.

The trial court's application of the doctrine of caveat emptor in this case
was proper.

Plaintiff acknowledges that Maack v. Resource Design & Const, Inc., 875 P.2d
570 (Utah App.,1994) and Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App., 1994) remain
governing law in Utah on the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor. Defendants
have previously analyzed these two case along with Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, \
24, 48 P.3d 235 and applied the rulings in those cases to the present case. [See
Defendants' Brief, pp. 32-34].
The following undisputed facts are also relevant [see Defendants' Brief, pp. 6-7]:
1.

An Earnest Money Sales Agreement ("EMSA") was executed between
Defendants and Plaintiffs on February 15, 1994 for the sale of the Home.

2.

The relevant provisions of the EMSA for purposes of this appeal are:
\l(e) Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property subject to
Section 1(c) above and 6 below, accepts in its present physical condition,
except: (BLANK)
\ 6. SELLER'S WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in
Section C, the following
% B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is
purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgement
and not by reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the
Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present
value, future value, income herefrom or as to its production. Buyer accepts
the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in
Section 6. In the event that Buyer desires an additional inspection, said
inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer.
% C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received
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no claim or notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the
property which has not or which will not be remedied prior to closing; (b)
all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments,
mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall be brought
current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air
conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances
shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing.
3.

Plaintiffs walked through the Home on February 11, 1994 before executing
the EMSA on February 15, 1994.

4.

Defendants read the "as is'Vno warranties clauses with Plaintiffs at the time
the EMSA was executed by both parties.

Despite the obvious disclaimers made by Defendants against any warranty other
those outlined in ^f C, despite the fact that Plaintiff and her husband agreed that they were
buying the home "as is," and despite the fact that Plaintiff could have obtained a home
inspection, Plaintiff chose to purchase the home without conducting any inspection.
The language of this Court in the Schafir decision bears repeating:
The responsibility to observe patent, and any discoverable latent, defects falls
on the buyer of the home and is usually accomplished by hiring a
knowledgeable home inspector to scrutinize the home before finalizing a sale.
Oftentimes, however, real estate agents and sellers are understandably unaware
of latent defects in the home at the time of sale. This is an inherent risk
involved in purchasing a home. Schafir, 879 P.2d at 1390 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).

Generally, absent some express agreement between the parties—which is
absent here—the doctrine of caveat emptor precludes a home buyer from
bringing suit for discoverable defects in the home. Especially when the sale of
a used home is involved, the purchaser is on notice that the residence is not
new and may contain defects affecting the home's quality or condition. Id. at
n.12.
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It is noteworthy that in the foregoing quote, this Court associates "patent" defects
as those that are observable and "latent" defects as "discoverable." Irrespective, this
Court correctly notes both patent and latent defects are typically "discoverable" through
the process of home inspection.
Another important aspect of this case that should not be overlooked is the fact that
the EMS A itself provided notice that the Plaintiffs were purchasing the home "as is"
without any reliance upon any representations of Defendants. The EMS A also indicates
that the buyers had conducted an inspection of their own and that they were entitled to
obtain a further professional inspection. All of these contractual "red flags" were placed
squarely within the purview of the Plaintiffs at the time they were considering purchasing
the home. In other words, Plaintiffs were doubly informed of their rights and potential
risks in this case. Even if the doctrine of caveat emptor was inapplicable, the trial court's
decision to grant summary judgment was still reasonable given the disclaimers in the
EMSA.
Plaintiff suggests that the Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919, decision
has created new judicial law imposing an implied warranty of habitability on all sales of
residential homes. In Smith v. Frandsen, the developer of a subdivision sold partially
developed property to a builder-contractor, who in turn sold the property to another
contractor-builder who then constructed a home. The new home was purchased by the
Smiths. The central question in the case was whether the remote developer could be
liable to homeowners for damages caused to the home as a result of unstable soil. The
focus in Smith v. Frandsen was not on whether the relationship between the Smiths and
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their builder-contractor imposed a legal duty to disclose information about soil
conditions. The builder-contractor was not a party to the lawsuit. The inquiry into the
builder-contractor's role was, instead, directed at whether parity existed between what the
builder-contractor knew about the condition of the soil that lay beneath the Smiths' house
and the developer's knowledge of the same soil instability.
Ultimately, the Smith v. Frandsen court found that the Smiths could not recover
from the developer because duty to disclose material information is extinguished once the
information is communicated or otherwise acquired by the party (in this case, the
builder-contractors) to whom the duty was first owed. Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, %
17.
Plaintiff emphasizes with bold lettering certain language from the Smith v.
Frandsen in support of its proposition that the doctrine of caveat emptor has been
abandoned in Utah. [See Plaintiffs Brief, pp. 34-35]. Yet, all of the language in that
quote is culled from other jurisdictions. The Smith v. Frandsen case was not directly
concerned with application of the doctrine of caveat emptor as between a home-builder
and a purchaser (as recognized in the concurring opinion of Justice Wilkins and Justice
Durrant). Moreover, the decision was rendered in 2004—well after the trial court issued
its Memorandum Decision on Defendants' second Motion for Summary Judgment in
August, 2003.
The trial court properly applied the doctrine of caveat emptor in granting summary
judgment in favor of Defendants on 35 of the 42 alleged defects as to Plaintiffs
Fraudulent Nondisclosure Claim. The ruling of the trial court on this matter should be
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affirmed.
V,

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S BREACH OF CONTRACT
CLAIM.
On appeal, a trial court's grant of summary judgment, is reviewed for correctness.

All undisputed facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
motion was granted. See Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, ^flO, 108 P.3d 701.
However, the reviewing court may affirm the result reached by the trial court "if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record even though that ground
or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling. Boud v. SDNCO,
Inc., 2002 UT 83, ^ 10, 54 P.3d 1131, (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260
(Utah 1998)).
As argued in the preceding sections of this brief and as set forth in Defendants'
brief-in-chief, Plaintiffs entire Breach of Contract claim (as well as her other claims) is
barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by the doctrine of caveat emptor. In
other words, the partial dismissal of Plaintiff s Breach of Contract claim as to all alleged
defects except for the finish grading issue (R. 1749) by the trial court was appropriate on
statute of limitations and/or caveat emptor theories in any case, and should be upheld.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Defendants will address the substance of Plaintiff s
argument that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of
Defendants as to the Breach of Contract claim.
The essence of Plaintiff s argument is whether paragraph "C" of the EMS A was
properly interpreted by the trial court. Specifically, the issue raised is whether Defendant
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Dan Smith received any claim or notice of zoning violation concerning the property. As
noted by Plaintiff, paragraph "C" of the EMS A contains the only warranties made by the
Defendants—the EMS A expressly disclaims all other warranties and/or representations.
Paragraph "C" provides:"
f C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has
received no claim or notice of any building or zoning violation
concerning the property which has not or which will not be remedied
prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes,
assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature
shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing,
heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and
appliances shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at
closing.
Defendants brought a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Breach of Contract claims. (R.
1377). Defendants argued that the EMS A itself contains a disclaimer of all warranties
and iterates the "as is" status of the home, except for those warranties contained in
paragraph "C." Defendants also noted that there was no evidence that the HVAC
(heating, air-conditioning, ventilating system) was inoperable at the time of closing. Nor
was there any evidence that the electrical systems, plumbing or appliances were not in
proper working condition at the time of closing. Plaintiff and her husband had used these
systems for over six years without complaint.
Plaintiff admitted that paragraph "C" was the only warranty given upon which she
could base a breach of contract claim. (R. 1528). Plaintiff s primary argument (which is
reasserted on appeal) is that "notice" of any zoning violation should be imputed to
Defendant Dan Smith because he was a licensed contractor and built the home.
Defendants have already responded to this position in their Reply Memorandum in
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Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims
[attached hereto as Addendum "3"].
Defendants reassert those same arguments as set forth in the Reply Memorandum,
namely: (1) that building inspector, Jack Peterson, performed a complete inspection,
finding no violations other than the incomplete grading, and issued a certificate of
occupancy, (2) a deviation from the applicable building code is not equivalent to a
"violation," (3) the building inspector should legally be the final authority as to whether a
"violation" exists or not—and in this case Jack Peterson issued the certificate of
occupancy, thereby approving the home as compliant with applicable building code
sections, (4) Paragraph "C" clearly states that the seller must not "receive" any claim or
notice of any building or zoning violation. It is undisputed that Defendants did not
"receive" any claim or notice of any building or zoning violation, (5) the applicable code
sections allow for some deviation.
Plaintiff tries to impose a specific definition of the term "notice" to the facts in this
case. However, when read in the context of paragraph "C," it is clear that Plaintiffs
multi-definitional version of the word "notice" is not what was intended. Plaintiff should
not be allowed to redefine the plain meaning of the term as it is used in the EMS A.
Plaintiff also briefly mentions that the attic ventilation system was not in proper
working order at the time of closing. Obviously, the trial court and the record prove
otherwise, and Plaintiff has not marshaled any evidence to support its contention. The
trial court was entirely justified in granting summary judgment as to the attic ventilation
system based on the evidence before it.
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The trial court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs Breach of Contract claims as to
all alleged defects other than the grading.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM.
On appeal, a trial court's grant of summary judgment, is reviewed for correctness.

All undisputed facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
motion was granted. See Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, ^[10, 108 P.3d 701.
However, the reviewing court may affirm the result reached by the trial court "if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record even though that ground
or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling. Boud v. SDNCO,
Inc., 2002 UT 83, Tf 10, 54 P.3d 1131, (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260
(Utah 1998)).
Plaintiff seeks review of the trial court's Order on Defendants' first Motion for
Summary Judgment. In that Order, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs claim for
Negligent Misrepresentation on the basis that the claim was barred by the doctrine of
merger. [See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 39].
As with the two preceding Sections of this brief, Defendants assert that
Plaintiffs Negligent Misrepresentation claim is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations and by the doctrine oi caveat emptor. Thus, the subsidiary issue of whether
the Negligent Misrepresentation claim was properly dismissed because of the merger
doctrine becomes irrelevant.
Furthermore, even if this Court finds that the trial court erred in dismissing
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Plaintiffs Negligent Misrepresentation claim, Plaintiff has also brought a claim for
Fraudulent Nondisclosure (which she prevailed on at trial). Plaintiff would not be entitled
to double recovery even if both claims were allowed and she prevailed on both claims.
Defendants otherwise do not contest the analysis of the issue of the doctrine of
merger set forth in Plaintiffs Brief (pp. 39-42). Because Defendants agree with
Plaintiffs analysis of the doctrine of merger, Defendants need not address whether the
collateral rights exception analysis presented by Plaintiff is accurate. Again, however,
Defendants assert that dismissal of the Negligent Misrepresentation claim was proper
because the claim was brought outside the statute of limitations period and/or because the
claim is barred by the doctrine of caveat emptor.
VII.

THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE MAJORITY RULE AND FIND
THAT RULE 26(b)(4)(C) DOES NOT PERMIT RECOVERY FOR AN
EXPERT'S TIME IN PREPARING FOR DEPOSITION.
Plaintiff claims that she should be compensated for her experts' time in preparing

for deposition. [See Plaintiffs Brief, pg 44]. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide
that "the court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable
fee for time spent in responding to discovery." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(i). This
statute is not ambiguous. It states that where one party deposes the opposing party's
expert, the deposing party is responsible to pay the expert "a reasonable fee" for the time
spent at the deposition. Id.
It has never been the customary practice in Utah for one party to pay the other
party's expert for the time that expert spends preparing for a deposition. Indeed, it is the
customary practice for the deposing attorney to pay only for the expert's time during the
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deposition. This custom is in harmony with the vast majority of federal courts
interpreting the identical federal discovery provision of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. An Illinois federal court succinctly stated the majority rule regarding payment
of expert witness preparation time, holding that "[i]t should normally be the case.. .that
Rule 26(b)(4)(C) does not permit recovery for time spent "preparing for a deposition."
Sears v. EEOC, 138 F.R.D. 523 (N.D. 111. 1991). See also S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee
Metropolitan Sewerage District, 154 F.R.D. 212, 214 (E.D.Wis. 1994); Cotton v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 457 F.2d 641, 546-47 (6th Cir. 1972); Herbst v. Int'l Telephone
& Telegraph Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528, 531 (D. Conn. 1975); and McBrian v. Liebert Corp.,
173 F.R.D. 491 (N.D. Ill 1997). The majority of federal courts uphold this rule because,
"[o]ne party need not pay for the other's trial preparation. Rhee v. Witco, 126 F.R.D. 45
(D. Kan. 2002).
It would be inequitable to require Defendants to pay for the dubiously lengthy
preparation time of Plaintiff s expert witnesses. Indeed, to adopt the rule as proposed by
Plaintiff would provide an incentive for plaintiffs to educate themselves and prepare for
trial at the expense of the party deposing their expert. Where a plaintiff is the one to
bring suit, the plaintiff should be required to pay for the cost of their own prosecution.
Otherwise, the defendant will in effect pay a substantial amount of the plaintiffs trial
preparation costs and plaintiffs' counsel's education.
Some of the federal courts in the majority do find an exception to the general rule
prohibiting the recovery for time spent by experts preparing for their depositions.
However, this exception does not apply to this case because the exception is limited to
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"complex cases where there has been a considerable lapse of time between an expert's
work on a case and the date of his actual deposition. S. A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee
Metropolitan Sewerage District, 154 F.R.D. 212, 214 (E.D. Wis. 1994). Here, a
considerable amount of time had not lapsed between the work of the Plaintiffs experts
and their depositions, and what time had passed was due to Plaintiffs failure over a
period of seven months to properly respond to discovery requests regarding her expert
witnesses. Moreover, this is not a complex case. See Rhee, 126 F.R.D. at 45 (single
plaintiff and one single defendant is not a complex case). Therefore, Defendants
respectfully request that the Court follow the majority rule and establish that
"normally.. .Rule 26(b)(4)(C) does not permit recovery for time spent "preparing for a
deposition." Sears, 138 F.R.D. 523.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS AWARD
OF ATTORNEY FEES WHERE THE COURT'S AWARD OF
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES WAS PROPERLY SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
Plaintiff alleges that the trial court erred in ruling that she was only entitled to
attorney's fees and costs on her Breach of Contract cause of action. [See Plaintiff Brief,
pp. 49]. Plaintiff further argues that the language found in the attorney's fees clause of
the EMSA exempted her from having to designate her fees based on successful and
unsuccessful claims as required by Utah law. [Id.] Alternatively, Plaintiff claims that
even if she was required to designate her fees, she fulfilled this requirement because "the
causes of action were so closely related and intertwined as to be indistinguishable." [Id.,
p. 50].
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Proceedings below. On or about April 4, 2005, Plaintiff filed a verified Motion
for Attorney's Fees and Costs asking the court to award her $120,645.88 in attorney fees
and $35,131.53 in costs for a total of $155,777.41. (R. 2148). Defendants filed
objections to the motion, arguing that Plaintiffs only right to fees and costs arose under
paragraph "N" of the EMS A and that, therefore, Plaintiff was only entitled to recover fees
incurred in bringing her Breach of Contract claim. (R. 2188). Defendants further noted
that the Plaintiff had failed to designate the fees attributable to unsuccessful claims as
opposed to successful claims as required by Utah law and therefore Plaintiffs request for
attorney fees and costs should be denied.
At a hearing on the issue, the court ruled that under Utah law, Plaintiff was only
entitled to recover attorney fees and costs where she had a contractual right to them and
that in this case a contractual right only arose from the Breach of Contract claim under the
EMS A. [R. Transcript hearing on Motions June 6, 2005, pp. 45-46]. In conformance
with this ruling, the trial court ordered that Plaintiff "review [her] proposed billing and
submit a new billing with those fees associated with pursuing the breach of contract claim
that [they] were successful on." [Id., p. 71].
On June 20, 2005, Plaintiff submitted her amended billing to the court. [See
Response to Court's Directive Regarding Attorney's Fees, Costs and Expenses, attached
hereto as Addendum "4"]. According to the amended billing, Plaintiffs claim for
attorney fees increased from their original claim of $155,777.41 to $158,927.72. This
increase reflected an additional $6,717.00 in attorney's fees accrued since the last motion
and a reduction of the original claim for attorney's fees in the amount of $3,822.24 in
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response to the Court's directive. In its order awarding attorney fees, the court noted that
"[i]n the Court's opinion Plaintiffs attorney made no real effort to comply with the
Court's directive to submit a claim for attorney's fees and costs associated with the
successful breach of contract claim." [See Plaintiffs Brief, Addendum No. "10," pp. 2-3].
The Court also concluded that because Plaintiff "failed to provide any factual basis
upon which the Court can determine the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs claim for
attorney's fees and costs, the Court will have to make its own evaluation of the request
based upon its knowledge of the case and evaluation of the claimed fees and costs and the
Court's experience and knowledge of attorney's fees in similar cases." [Id.] The court
then reviewed Plaintiffs request for attorney fees based on the factors set out in Dixie
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) and ultimately determined that it was
reasonable for Plaintiff to be awarded attorney fees in the amount of $40,000 and costs in
the amount of $10,000. [Id., pp. 3-5].
Standards of review. Whether Plaintiff was entitled to recover attorney fees and
costs under the EMS A is a question of law which the court will review for correctness.
Maynard v. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah App. 1996). However, the determination
of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees and costs "is in the sound discretion of the
trial court, and will not be overturned absent the showing of a clear abuse of discretion."
Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988 (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court has noted,
"[b]ecause the trial court is in a better position than an appellate court to gauge the quality
and efficiency of the representation and the complexity of the litigation, we have
endowed the trial courts with discretion to assess the reasonableness of the fees requested
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under a contract or statute." Foote v. Clarke, 962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1998).
A.

The trial court correctly found that Plaintiff was only entitled to
recover the fees arising from the Breach of Contract claim.

Plaintiff is only entitled to recover her attorney fees and costs incurred in pursuit of
the breach of contract claim. In Utah, attorney fees authorized by contract are awardable
only in accordance with the explicit terms of the contract and only to the extent permitted
by the contract. Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc. 645 P.2d 667, 671
(Utah 1982); Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Utah
App. 1989). Furthermore, parties seeking an award of attorney fees under a contract must
establish that the contract's terms anticipate such an award. Maynard v. Wharton, 9Y1
P.2d 446 (Utah App. 1996).
Plaintiffs claim for attorney fees and costs arises under Paragraph "N" of the
"EMSA". Paragraph "N" provides, in pertinent part:
Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or
agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue
from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy
provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by
filing suit or otherwise.
Plaintiff argues that under this clause, she is entitled to recover all attorney fees
incurred in pursuit of all six of her causes of action, not just those fees arising from her
breach of contract action. [See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 47].
This issue on appeal is governed by the case of Foote v. Clark, in which the Utah
Supreme Court examined an award of attorney fees based on a clause virtually identical
to the one at issue. See Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998).
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In Foote v. Clark, the parties entered into a standard real estate purchase contract
for the sale of a home. The attorney fee provision in the real estate purchase contract
stated:
Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or
agreements contained herein, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee which may arise or accrue
from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy
provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by
filing suit or otherwise. See Foote, 962 P.2d at 54.
This provision is virtually identical to the attorney fee provision contained in
Paragraph "N" of the EMS A. Later, when the parties were unable to agree as to certain
of the contract's provisions, defendant sold the home to a third party. Plaintiff brought a
suit for breach of contract against defendant, and a suit for tortuous interference with the
contract against defendant's real estate agent and brokers. At trial, the court found that
although defendant had breached the contract, plaintiff had suffered no actual harm and
therefore was only entitled to minimal damages. The court also ruled that pursuant to the
attorney fee provision of the contract, plaintiff was entitled to recover all of its attorney
fees and costs from defendant, even those expended in pursuing claims against
defendant's agents.
On appeal, defendant argued that a plaintiff who only recovers nominal damages is
not considered "successful" under Utah law, and therefore is not entitled to attorney fees
under a "prevailing party" statute. See Fashion Place Associates v. Glad Rags, Inc., 754
P.2d 940, 942 (Utah 1988) (holding that a party who recovers only nominal damages is
not "successful" where the attorney fees contract clause provided that "the unsuccessful
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party in such action or proceeding agrees to reimburse the successful party for the
reasonable expense of attorney fees..."). The Supreme Court rejected this argument and
found that "[t]he amount of plaintiffs' recovery in this case is irrelevant under the
language of the contract." Id. at 54. "Rather, the sole criterion for the plaintiff to obtain
attorney fees in a remedial action pursuant to this contract is to show a default by the
other contract party." Id. The Court noted, however, that "[t]he contract only authorizes
fees to be collected for time expended in remedying a default in the purchase agreement."
Id. at 55.
B.

Under paragraph "N" of the EMS A, a party may only recover attorney
fees incurred in enforcing the agreement if it can prove the other party
defaulted on the Agreement.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in ruling that she could not recover
attorney fees and costs on all of their causes of action. [See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 47].
Plaintiff bases this claim on the assertion that Paragraph "N" of the EMS A "requires that
that [sic] the defaulting party., .pay all costs, expenses and reasonable attorney's fee."
[See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 49]. Plaintiff further argues that "[j]ust because Plaintiffs basis
for recovery was found in a contract, does not necessarily mean that she could only
recover for breach of that contract." [Id., p. 50]
These arguments misconstrue the law in Foote v. Clark. As noted by the Court,
the contract, or EMSA, "only authorizes fees to be collected for time expended in
remedying a default in the purchase agreement." Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. Plaintiff points
out that Defendants' default in the EMSA arose from their breach of Paragraph C(a) of
the EMSA with respect to the violation of the building code for improper grading. [See
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Plaintiffs Brief, pg. 48] Therefore, under Foote v. Clark, Plaintiff is only authorized to
collect fees for time spent remedying the default, or in other words, the time spent
remedying the breach of contract claim respecting the violation of the building code for
improper grading.
Plaintiff is correct in arguing that paragraph "N" does not require there to be a
successful or prevailing party in order for attorney's fees to be awarded. Rather, all a
plaintiff must do in order to recover attorney fees under paragraph "N" is prove that the
defendant defaulted under the contract. A plaintiff has proven there is a default only when
the court or jury makes a finding of fact that the defendant breached, or defaulted, on the
contract. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it limited Plaintiffs recovery of
attorney fees to the portion of the breach of contract claim they were successful on.
C.

The trial court's evaluation of reasonable attorney fees was properly
supported by its findings of fact.

On appeal, Plaintiff argues "that the trial court erred in arbitrarily reducing
Plaintiffs attorney fees and costs without support in its Findings of Fact." [See Plaintiffs
Brief, p. 53].
It is well established that "An award of attorney fees must be based on evidence
and supported by findings of fact." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268
(Utah 1992). Therefore, "[the] party who requests an award of attorney fees has the
burden of presenting evidence sufficient to support an award." Id. For this reason, the
courts have required that one who seeks a reward must set out the time and fees expended
for:
(1) Successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees,
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(2) Unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an entitlement to
attorney fees had the claims been successful, and
(3) Claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees. Id,
After a party has submitted sufficient evidence supporting the request of an award,
the trial court must then make its own independent determination of the reasonableness
of the requested fees in light of that parties' evidence. Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. However,
while ultimately "a trial court may, in its discretion, deny fees altogether for [the
requesting party's] failure to allocate, it may not award wholesale all attorney fees
requested if they have not been allocated as to separate claims and/or parties." Foote,
962 P.2d at 57.
On April 4, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion and supporting memorandum requesting
an award of attorney fees. (R. 2148). The trial court found the evidence in the
supporting memorandum insufficient, however, because it failed to allocate fees between
successful and unsuccessful claims. In an attempt to remedy this insufficiency, the court
ordered Plaintiff to "review [her] proposed billing and submit a new billing with those
fees associated with pursuing the breach of contract claim that she was successful on."
[R. Transcript hearing on Motions June 6, 2005, p. 71]. In spite of the court's direct
order, Plaintiffs response to the court's directive contained only minor modifications
from the prior request.
In its memorandum order awarding attorney fees, the court noted that "[i]n the
Court's opinion Plaintiffs attorney made no real effort to comply with the Court's
directive to submit a claim for attorney's fees and costs associated with the successful
breach of contract claim." [See Plaintiffs Brief, Addendum No. "10," pp. 2-3]. The
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court therefore determined that "[s]ince the Plaintiff has failed to provide any factual
basis upon which the Court can determine the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs claim for
attorney's fees and costs, the Court will have to make its own evaluation of the request
based upon its knowledge of the case and evaluation of the claimed fees and costs and the
Court's experience and knowledge of attorney's fees in similar cases."
On appeal, in defense of her failure to designate fees, Plaintiff argues that even if
she was required to designate her fees, she met this requirement because it was
impossible to separate the time spent on the Breach of Contract claim compared to the
other causes of action. [See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 50]. Likewise, Plaintiff argues that her
recovery of attorney fees should not be limited to those fees arising from the Breach of
Contract claim because her causes of action "were so closely related and intertwined as to
be indistinguishable." [Id.]. Plaintiff argues that because her causes of action are so
closely related, she is entitled to recover the fees expended in pursuit of all the claims
because "[w]here the proof of a compensable claim and otherwise non-compensable
claim are closely related and require proof of the same facts, a successful party is entitled
to recover its fees incurred in proving all of the related facts." [Id. (citing Kurth v.
Wiarda, 991 P.2d 113,116 (Utah App. 1999)).]
In Winters v. Schulrnan, this court affirmed that when there are multiple claims and
the party prevails on only a portion of them, if the claims all involve a common core of
facts and legal theories, the party may recover all attorney fees reasonably incurred.
Winters v. Schulrnan, 2001 WL 357124 (Utah App. 2001). However, the court also noted
that it was not an abuse of discretion when a trial court reduced the fee requested based
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on the trial court's specific finding that although the facts and legal theories involved in
the claims originally overlapped, they were "not so intertwined that they could not be
categorized according to the theory at issue." Id.
Like the court in Winters v. Schulman, the trial court in the case at hand did not
commit an abuse of discretion when it reduced the fees Plaintiff requested. In its
Findings of Facts on the issue of attorney fees, the trial court specifically noted:
The Court realizes that it is difficult to differentiate between what legal
services were necessary for the prosecution of the subject breach of contract
claim and the Plaintiffs other causes of action. The Court does know from his
involvement with the case that a substantial portion of the motions in the case,
especially the various motions for summary judgment involved causes of
action other than the breach of contract cause of action. It is the Court's
perception also that a substantial portion of the discovery in the case involves
defects other than the improper grading and involved information dealing with
the other causes of action.
Based on these findings, Plaintiff should have been able to designate her fees as
requested, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to award her the
entire amount of herrequest.
The court also based its reduction of the requested amount of attorney fees on its
evaluation of the factors set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Dixie State
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) that trial courts should consider in
determining a reasonable attorneys fee. In regards to the issue of whether the work
performed was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter, the Court
observed that both sides generated attorney fees that were not reasonable or necessary.
Specifically, the court found that "[tjhere were substantial unnecessary attorney's fees
generated in Motions to Reconsider and in disputes over the language in proposed orders
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and unnecessary discovery disputes." [See Plaintiffs Brief, Addendum No. "10," p. 4].
The trial court went on to identify two other factors that while not determinative of the
reasonableness of the subject fee, were factors the court believed relevant in making an
overall determination of reasonableness. First, the fact that the requested fee of $120,000
was more then four times the monetary award granted to the Plaintiff by the jury, and
second, that the requested fee was substantially more than the entire purchase price of the
house at issue. Id. Ultimately, the court noted that "[gjiven the fact the Plaintiff failed to
respond to the Court directive to recalculate her attorney's fees and costs to those
associated with the breach of contract claim only and for the reasons stated above, the
Court finds that it is reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded an attorney's fee in the
amount of $40,000." Id.
D.

The trial court did not apply Rule 54(d) standards to his determination
of reasonable costs.

Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in applying Utah R. Civ. P.
54(d) standards to the meaning of costs. In reviewing Plaintiffs itemized claims for costs
the trial court noted that many of the items listed were not the type of costs usually
recoverable under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [See Plaintiffs Brief,
Addendum No. "10," p. 4]. The Court then went on to list the other, nontraditional costs
that Plaintiff claimed she had a right to recover under paragraph "N" of the EMS A. The
court ultimately found that as the prevailing party, Plaintiff was "entitled to recover those
normal costs awarded to a prevailing party pursuant to Rule 54 and any other costs or
expenses associated with the breach of contract claim. As can be seen by this language,
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the court was not "limiting the meaning of costs to fit within the confines of Rule 54" as
Plaintiff claims. Instead, plaintiffs limitation on the recovery of costs occurred for the
same reason as its limitation on the recovery of attorney fees, because "[t]here was no
attempt by Plaintiff to allocate which costs.. .should be attributed to the breach of contract
claims for which recovery was awarded by the jury." Likewise, because the Plaintiff
"failed to respond to the Court directive to recalculate her.. .costs to those associated with
the breach of contract claim only and for the reasons stated above, the Court [found] that
it was reasonable to award costs in the amount of $10,000." Id.
Plaintiffs final attorney fee and costs request in the amount of $158,927.72 is
shocking given the fact that the cost of the home itself was only $83,000.00. Plaintiffs
request does not even take into account the award of damages in the amount of
$30,680.00. The trial court simply did not abuse its discretion in limiting the recovery by
Plaintiff of her fees and costs.
Finally, Plaintiff would not be entitled to recover any fees or costs should this
Court find that Plaintiffs Breach of Contract claims are barred by the relevant statue of
limitations.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred by failing to determine and require the jury to determine when
Plaintiffs causes of action could have been reasonably discovered. This failure of the
trial court and jury to situate this fact throughout the course of litigation led to numerous
mistakes in sundry rulings by the trial court and ultimately in the verdict rendered by the
jury. Instead, the jury was improperly asked to determine a question of law (whether the
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statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs claims) without first determining when the
Plaintiffs causes of action accrued. These failures resulted in a misapplication of the
incorrect statute of limitations, and a misinterpretation of that statute.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs claims should have been barred by the doctrine of caveat
emptor because Plaintiff could have discovered any patent or latent defects through a
simple inspection. The EMS A indicated that the Plaintiff and her husband were
purchasing the home "as is" and even granted Plaintiff an opportunity to have the home
inspected. Plaintiff failed to do so.
The trial court correctly granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants
on both Plaintiffs Fraudulent Nondisclosure claim and the Breach of Contract claim. In
any case, both claims should have been barred by the statute of limitations and/or the
doctrine of caveat emptor.
Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees or costs because her breach of contract
claim is barred by the statute of limitations and/or caveat emptor. Defendants, however,
should be entitled to recoup all of their reasonable attorney's fees and costs as set forth in
the EMS A for prevailing in their defense under the contract.
Accordingly, Defendants respectfully request that this Court:
1.

2.
3.
4.

partially reverse the following Orders insofar as those Orders failed to
properly apply and interpret the correct statute of limitations : (a)
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment entered on August 16, 2001,
(b) Order partially denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
entered on August 29, 200
remand for new trial, if necessary on any of Plaintiff s claims that survive
summary judgment
reverse the Special Verdict and Judgment entered on March 10, 2005 for
the amount of $30,680.00 against Defendants and in favor of Plaintiffs;
reverse the Order denying Defendants' Rule 50(b) Motion for Judgment
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5.
6.
7.

Notwithstanding the Verdict entered on July 6, 2005
reverse the Order denying Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the
Judgment entered on July 19, 2005;
reverse the Order entered on August 25, 2005 awarding attorneys' fees to Plaintiff
inasmuch as Plaintiffs failed on her breach of contract claim;
instruct the trial court to award Defendants their reasonable attorney's fees and
costs incurred in defending this lawsuit and pursuant to the EMSA.
Respectfully submitted this 18•*ST
day of September, 2006

/
(

ASCIONE; HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C.,
Attorneys for Defendants Dan Smith and Carol Smith
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ADDENDA
1.

August 21, 2003 Memorandum Decision

2.

Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

3.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on
Breach of Contract Claims

4.

Response to Court's Directive Regarding Attorney Fees, Costs and Expenses.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the r5k_ day °f September, 2006,1 caused to be delivered via the following
method two copies of the foregoing to the following:
Greg B. Hadley (USB 3652)
Paul D. Dodd (USB 10675)
HADLEY DODD
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 260
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 801-377-4403
Facsimile: 801-377-4411
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WILLIAM MOORE and MARY
MOORE,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 000700142 MI

DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
and CAROL SMITH, individually and as
Trustee of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos
Trust,

Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Court has reviewed the file, considered the pleadingsfiledby the parties, heard the argument of
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, issues this ruling:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, recission,fraudulentnondisclosure,
misrepresentation, violation of the Consumer Sales Practice Act, and punitive damages causes of
action. Defendants raised the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations among others.
Defendants filed a previous Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court granted the Motion as to
the claim for negligent misrepresentation and dismissed the claim. The Court denied the Motion
as to Plaintiffs fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent misrepresentation claims. The Court also
ruled that the discovery rule applies in this case and tolled the statute of limitations. The Plaintiffs
were also required to elect a remedy, and the Plaintiffs elected to pursue the remedy of recession.

Defendantsfiledthis second Motion for Summary Judgment,
inVPISPUTED FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs' home, the subject matter of this litigation, is located at 155 West 300

South, Fillmore City, Millard County, State of Utah (hereinafter the "Home").
2.

Defendant Dan Smith is an experienced licensed builder, who obtained the proper

building permit and constructed the Home with the intent that it be Defendants1 residence.
3.

Neither of the Plaintiffs have ever been a contractor or an engineer, nor do

Plaintiffs have any special knowledge concerning building codes, home construction, safety
inspections, etc.
4.

The Home's construction was inspected and approved by the Fillmore City

Building Inspector throughout its construction
5.

At the time of thefinalinspection, the ground around the house was so muddy that

thefinishgrading was impossible. Jack Peterson, Fillmore City's Building Inspector, gave the
Smiths permission tofinishgrading in the spring when the weather cleared Based upon the
Smiths' promise to complete the grading, Jack Peterson approved thefinalHome inspection As
uncorrected this is a violation of the Uniform Building Code.
6.

Defendants moved in to the Home in November of 1993, Defendants received a

Certificate of OcbupancyfromFillmore City Building Inspector on or about January 28, 1994.
On February 11, 1994 the Plaintiffs and Defendants met to discuss the sale of the Home, and an
Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered between the parties on or about February 15, 1994
7.

The Agreement stated in pertinent part that;

Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1(c)
above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical condition, except:
(blank)
8.

The relevant general provisions state:
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B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is
purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by
reason of any representation made by to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling
Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income
here from or as to its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition
subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6, In the event that Buyer
desires an additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but
arranged for and paid by Buyer.
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller wairants that: (a) Seller has received no
claim or notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which
has not or which will not be remedied prior to closing.
9.

Plaintiffs walked through the Home before entering into the Agreement.

Defendants did not disclose any alleged code violations or defects to the Plaintiffs prior to the sell.
10.

Plaintiffs did not condition the purchase of the property on the outcome of a home

inspection, and Plaintiffs did not have an independent home inspection performed prior to
purchasing the Home.
11.

In the year 2000, Jason Bullock walked through the house as though he were

performing afinalinspection and discovered the thirty (30) alleged code violations identified by
the Plaintiffs. An addition twelve (12) alleged code violations identified by the Plaintiffs were
added by Lloyd Steenblik's inspection.
13.

Plaintiffs admitted that all of the (forty two) 42 alleged defects could have been

discovered by a home inspection before they bought the house, and Plaintiffs admitted that the
only latent defects as defined by the court are alleged defect items 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38, 39,
DISPUTED FACTS
1.

The home contained Uniform Building Code (UBC) violations during the

inspection period and the home was approved despite those alleged violations. The Smiths were
aware of the alleged UBC violations.
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2.

Felt paper was properly installed and served asflashingfor the windows,

3.

Some floor joists are overspanned,

4.

Plaintiffs discovered or were placed on notice of many of the alleged defects long

before the home inspection in 2000.
5.

Alleged defect items 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38, 39 are latent defects.
ANALYSIS AND RULING

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. When applying this rule, the Utah Supreme
Court has indicated that, when considering a motion for summary judgment, all facts and
inferences arising therefrom must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party
Winegar v. Froer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, the Court hereby grants
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in part and denies in part.
Fraudulent Nondiclosure
To support a claim of fraudulent nondisclosure a plaintiff must show (1) the nondisclosed
information is material, (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose,
and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate. Mitchell v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572, 576 (Utah
2001).
In the sale of new homes, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the doctrine of caveat
emptor has eroded, but in the area of used residences it is "reasonable to hold the purchaser to the
caveat emptor doctrine." See, Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P,2d 1384, 1389 (Utah App.
1994)(quoting, Utah State Medical Ass'n v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643,
645 (Utah 1982). A home inspection is not required when purchasing a new home because the

Ruling Page 4

doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply. In this case, Plaintiffs did not dispute that the Smiths
lived in the Home or that the Smiths intended it to be their home in their response to Defendants'
first Motion for Summary Judgment, therefore, it is an admission. The Court finds that the Home
is a used home because the Smiths intended it to be their home, they lived in the Home for a short
period of time, and Plaintiffs have admitted these facts.
A duty to disclose in a vendor-vendee transaction of a used home exists only where a
defect is "not discoverable by reasonable care," and if the defect could be discovered by
reasonable care, the doctrine of caveat emptor prevails and precludes recovery by the vendee.
Mitchell 31 P.3d at S15\Maackv. Resource Design & Const, Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 579 (Utah
App. 1994), The standard of reasonable care is whether the defect would be apparent to ordinary
prudent persons with like experience, not to persons with specialized knowledge in the field of
construction or real estate. Mitchell, 31 P.3d at 575, The ordinary prudent person standard does
not mean that inspection by an expert will never be required. There are circumstances where
"reasonably prudent buyer should be put on notice that a possible defect exists, necessitating
either further inquiry of the owner of the home, who is under a duty not to engage in fraud,
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980), or inspection by someone with sufficient
expertise to appraise the defect." Mitchell, 31 P.3d at 575,
Citing facts most favorable to Plaintiffs, the nonmoving party, the alleged nondisclosed
building code defects are material, and Defendant Smiths knew of the alleged building code
violations. Therefore, the Smiths were only legally obligated to disclose defects that were not
discoverable by reasonable care.
Plaintiffs admitted that all of the defects items except items number 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38,
39 were patent and that they could have been discovered by a home inspection. Therefore, the
doctrine of caveat emptor applies, and the Court grants the Defendants Motion for Summary
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Judgment regarding the admitted patent items because they could have reasonably been
discovered by the Plaintiffs.
Additionally, the Court finds that alleged defect item number 12, "no smoke detectors in
bedrooms and the only smoke detector in the house is a battery detector" to be an item that could
have reasonably been discovered by the Plaintiffs. Likewise, alleged defect Item number 38
"insulation baffles to allow ventilation at exterior walls" is an item that could have reasonably
been discovered by the Plaintiffs by observing there were not vents on the House in the roof area
Therefore, the Court grants the Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as to these alleged
defects and denies the Motion as to the remaining alleged defects.
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
The elements of an action based on fraudulent misrepresentation are- (1) a representation,
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact, (3) which was false, (4) which the representor
either, (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge up
which to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it,
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon
it, and (8) was thereby induced to act to his injury and damage. Maack, 875 p,2d at 584.
In Maack, caveat emptor was not dispositive of this issue. The Court relied on whether
the misrepresentation was concerning a presently existing material fact. Id, at 584. The Court
finds that there are disputed material facts regarding this claim and denies Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment as to this claim.
Statute of Limitations
Construction defect cases are governed by Utah Code Section 78-12-21,5, which states
that an action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within
six years of the date of completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction All other

Ruling Page 6
R P P P I VPH

T i mp

Nov

If)

II

^1AM

actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two years from the earlier of the date
of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which a cause of action should have been
discovered through reasonable diligence. Also, this Court ruled in the first Motion for Summary
Judgment that the discovery doctrine applies in this case The discovery doctrine tolls a cause of
action until the plaintiff knew or should have known the facts giving rise to the cause of action
BYUv. Paulsen, 744 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 1987) Plaintiffs assert that they were first aware of
the defects in the year 2000. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs were aware of some of the defects
shortly after moving into the home, The Court finds that there are disputed material facts as to
this defense and deny Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as to this issue.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court hereby grants Defendants' Motion for Summary
regarding the Plaintiffs' Fraudulent Nondisclosure claim as to defect items 1-8, 10, 12 -257 28-38,
and 40. The Court denies the Defendants' Motion as to all remaining issues The Court directs
counsel for the defendant to prepare an order consistent with the decision, submit it to opposing
counsel for review, and then to the Court for execution.
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JUDGMENT

Civil No. 000700142 MI
Judge EYRE

DISCUSSION OF UNDISPUTED FACTS-REBUTTAL TO PLAINTIFFS FALSE

STATEMENTS ATTEMPTING TO CREATE ISSUES OF FACT.
Nearly every fact that Plaintiffs tried to dispute remains undisputed. The tactic Plaintiffs'
counsel employs to dispute facts suggests his modus operandi: he misstates or mis-characterizes the
fact in order to have grounds to dispute it. This is apparent with every alleged disputed material fact.
Fact Number 2:

'The Smiths built the Home for their own residence. Deposition of

Dan Smith, p. 71, the pertinent pages of which are annexed hereto as Exhibit 4."
The Smiths supported this statement with deposition testimony of Dan Smith. The Plaintiffs
U5L'

dispute this fact by a reference to the deposition of Mary Moore that says nothing of Dan Smiths'
intentions. Plaintiffs also cite to the deposition of Jack Peterson where on several pages he states
his understanding that the Smiths intended to live in the home he was inspecting. Page 63 of his
deposition cited by Plaintiffs shows a good example: "well, I think ought to be clear is at that time
this home was, as far as I knew, not for sale. I thought Dan and his wife were going to be in there
permanently." Therefore, Jack Peterson's deposition supports the Smiths' assertion of fact.
Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that the Smiths built the home for the purpose of
resale. There is only Plaintiffs' disbelief of the testimony of Dan Smith and Jack Peterson. The
Plaintiffs can choose to disbelieve the Smiths' intentions and Dan Smiths' and Jack Peterson's
testimony, but if they are to raise a genuine issue they must do so with facts. The only facts alleged
by Plaintiffs are misleading. While it is true that the Certificate of Occupancy was issued in January
of 1994, the final inspection happened on November 8, 1993. See exhibit 8 to the moving
memorandum. The Smiths moved in shortly thereafter, one week before Thanksgiving. Dan Smith
deposition, p. 61, lines 14-15 annexed hereto as exhibit 15. Plaintiffs also fail to acknowledge that
the house was not listed for sale when they approached the Smiths about buying it. Dan Smith
deposition, pp. 67-68. Moore deposition, p. 9,11. 12-13. The Plaintiffs also fail to acknowledge that
the sale of the house did not close until May 2, 1994. Affidavit of Mary Moore, p. 61, line 4,
annexed hereto as exhibit 16. See also Settlement Statement annexed hereto as exhibit 17. Nor do
they acknowledge that Smith testified that they moved because the Smith's son moved to Cedar City
and asked his father to build him a new home in Cedar City. Dan Smith deposition. P. 61.
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Fact Number 4:

"The Home's construction was inspected and approved by the

appropriate agencies throughout its construction. See May 4, 2001, letter from Fillmore City
annexed hereto as Exhibit 6. Also see p. 89 of Peterson deposition annexed hereto as Exhibit 7."
These facts are not in dispute. There is no dispute that Jack Peterson actually approved the
final inspection and issued a Certificate of Occupancy. Plaintiffs' counsel goes off on a tangent
about whether a building inspector has the right to approve code violations. Thus, he engages in this
self-contradiction at page 2 of his brief: "Approval of a violation of the UBC shall not be construed
to be "approval." This argument assumes facts that don't exist in this case except in a couple of
instances, one involving the stairs where Jack Peterson observed the stairs were not compliant and
specifically approved them as a variance. Whether Jack Peterson had the right to approve a
variance1 is beside the point. He did approve the stairs. There is no factual citation to the contrary.
This is simply another illustration of Plaintiffs' counsel's willingness to torture key definitions in
the most brazen and audacious ways.
The relevance of the city building inspector's approval is very important. It addresses
whether Dan Smith was aware of latent defects. If he received approval of the building inspector
on the very points where he has been accused of code violations he has no reason to believe that
there are latent defects he must disclose to any purchasers.
Fact Number 5: "The Fillmore City Building Inspector, Jack Peterson, discussed the amount

1

The Smiths' expert has said that the code does give the inspector this right. But that is
an issue that need not be discussed because it is not relevant to this motion.
3

of roof ventilation with Mr. Smith and approved the as-built ventilation. See Deposition of Jack
Peterson at p. I l l , Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 5 to his deposition, annexed as Exhibit 7a."
Fact Number 6: "The City Building Inspector expressly approved the height of the stairs
even though they were not in technical compliance with the code. See Exhibit 7, Peterson
deposition at pp. 65, 66."
Plaintiffs' counsel simply asserts that "approval" was not granted based on his argument that
Peterson's approval was not "approval." The purpose of a statement of facts is to show the court
where there are genuine issues of fact. This quibbling over definitions frustrates this purpose. There
can be no communication here because words don't mean to Plaintiffs counsel what they mean
ordinarily. The Smiths' factual assertions in five and six are that the inspector approved the attic
ventilation and the stairs. There is no rational or genuine dispute about these facts. The legal effect
of this fact might be disputed but Plaintiffs cannot honestly deny the fact exists simply because they
dispute its relevance.
Fact Number 7: "During one of the construction inspections, the City Building Inspector
observed the felt paper that served as flashing for the windows. See Peterson deposition at p. 54,
Exhibit 7."
Here again Plaintiff cannot honestly dispute this fact. Whether Plaintiffs' experts who never
did destructive testing disagree is irrelevant. The fact that Jack Peterson observed it is undisputed.
Fact Number 8: "The Smiths obtained a Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance
on or about January 28, 1994. See Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance annexed to
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Peterson deposition as Exhibit 7, found here as Exhibit 8."
Fact Number 9: "The City Building Inspector signed off on the certificate of occupancy and
the final inspection. See Peterson deposition, at p. 88, Exhibit 7."
Here again, Plaintiffs' grounds for dispute are dishonest. They do not really dispute the
facts. They cannot. They only allege that the certificate is meaningless because it was fraudulently
obtained. They of course have no facts to support this outrageous allegation. Where do they even
insinuate that Jack Peterson was deceived? He saw everything and approved it. This deserves Rule
11 Sanctions.
Facts Numbered 23-23g: "Plaintiffs discovered, or, were placed on notice of, many of the
alleged defects long before the home inspection in 2000:
A.

Mary Moore knew of the alleged window defects almost immediately upon

moving into the house when she saw flaking of paint caused by water at the end of the first winter.
See Moore deposition, Vol I, pp. 41-42. Exhibit 11.
B.

Mary Moore also saw exposed footings the first spring when she moved into

the house while doing landscaping. See Moore deposition, Vol I, pp. 46,47. Exhibit 11.
C.

Defect Number 4 on Steenblik's list, alleging water damage and cracking to

the southeast corner of the foundation, was known to Mary Moore the first spring after she moved
into the house. See Moore deposition, Vol. I, pp. 107-108. Exhibit 11.
D.

Some allegedly bad shingles on the garage roof were called to Mary Moore's

attention on November 7, 1997, when she had the shingles inspected by the shingle manufacturer
5

and was told that they were damaged by inadequate ventilation. See Moore deposition, Vol. II, p.
167 (Exhibit 11), and Exhibit 6 to her deposition. (Annexed here as 11A).
E.

Defect Number 41 in Steenblik' s list, alleging plumbing defects, were known

to Mary Moore six months after she moved into the Home. See Moore deposition, Vol. I, p. 27.
Exhibit 11.
R

Defect Number 12, alleging that the smoke detectors were omitted from the

bedrooms, was known to Mary Moore approximately one year after moving into the Home. See
Moore deposition, Vol. I, pp. 94,95. Exhibit 11.
G.

The various minor electrical problems alleged by Plaintiffs were known to

Mary Moore in December, 1997, when she was given notice of the need to check the circuit breaker
after the furnace stopped working. See Moore deposition, Vol. I, p. 104. Exhibit 11. See also
Exhibit 11 A."
Plaintiffs' disputations of these facts are again inappropriate. Mary Moore saw these
conditions as she testified in her deposition. She was asked to testify to the damage she had seen
caused by the defects alleged. She responded to those questions in the pages cited above. Plaintiffs
have not shown that these deposition citations are wrong. Plaintiffs simply argue that knowledge
of the condition is not knowledge of a defect. They argue that Mary Moore needed an expert
opinion before she knew there were defects. The Smiths disagree, asserting confidently that when
Mary learned of the condition the statute of limitations began to run, not when she was given an
expert's report. That is a legitimate issue of law which is discussed below. However, it is not an
6

issue of fact. For plaintiffs' counsel to pretend that Mary Moore did not see the flaking of paint at
window sills which she herself attributed to defective windows is sanctionable.
Fact Number 25: "Plaintiffs have admitted that all of the alleged defects are patent except
items 9, 12, 26, 27, 38 and 39.2 See Plaintiffs' Answers to Second Set of Admission, Response
Number 9, and the Second Set of Requests for Admission, Request Number 9. Exhibit 10."
The cited responses to requests for admissions clearly show that Plaintiffs did make the
admissions stated. Plaintiffs have disputed this only on the grounds that the definition of "latent
defects" that they were using when they answered the requests was a different definition than what
they are using to dispute Fact Number 25. That sophistry is nothing less than sanctionable. It
should be given no credence by this court. As shown in the moving brief, the requests themselves
refer the plaintiffs to the use of the phrase "latent defect" by the court in its previous order on the
Smiths' motion for summary judgment. Anticipating the Plaintiffs' counsel's slipperiness, the
Smiths defined the phrase for him in the requests to admit and yet he still has the audacity to use
double definitions.

2

The Smiths propounded to the Plaintiffs a request for admission intended to establish
which defects were admittedly patent and which were considered by the Plaintiffs to be "latent,"
as the latter term is used in the Court's August 16, 2001, Order. Request Number 9 stated:
Admit that the alleged construction defects described in items 1 thru 42 in your
expert witness report at the time of the sale of the house were not a latent defects
as the phrase "latent defecf'is used in the court's order regarding the Smiths'
motion for summary judgment."
In response, Plaintiffs admitted that all of the defects were not latent except items 9, 12, 26, 27,
38 and 39.
7

Fact Number 26: 'There is no evidence of serious damage to the integrity of the house.
There is no allegation that the roof leaks. See Mary Moore deposition, p. 20. Exhibit 11. There is
no known damage to footings or foundation. See Mary Moore deposition p. 45. Exhibit 11."
Plaintiffs' counsel misleads in this attempted to dispute of facts. Again, the factual matter
is not disputed. Mary Moore admitted there were no roof leaks, and that she knew of no damage to
the footings or foundation. Neither do her experts. Counsel simply changes the definition of
"damage to the integrity of the house" to mean that technical code violations constitute physical
damage. It is close to intentional falsehood. It is certainly sanctionable.
Fact Number 29: "Allegation of Overspanning of Floor Joists. Peterson testified that the
code allows for a 13 foot one inch span. Peterson measured the span and found in his report ,
Exhibit 4 to his deposition, annexed hereto as Exhibit 7B, that no joists exceeded that span. P. 75."
Again, these facts are undisputed. Plaintiffs do not cite facts to the contrary. That they have
an expert who at one time had a different opinion does not change the fact that the building inspector
found the floor joists to be code compliant. The relevance of this fact is not whether the code allows
that length of floor joist. The relevant fact is Smith's knowledge of any potential defect. Dan Smith
had no reason to believe that he should disclose anything about floor joists to the plaintiffs. The
conclusion about Smith's knowledge might even be in dispute but the fact that Peterson found the
floor joists to be code compliant is not disputed.
Fact Numbers 30 and 31: "Alleged lack of dirt covering the footings. At the time of the
final inspection the ground around the house was so "muddy" that the finish "grading was
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the home in question, may have had a legal duty to disclose to Plaintiffs any latent and material
defects in the home" of which the Smiths were aware. Plaintiffs quote in their brief this pertinent
language from Maack: if there are any '"material defects of which the seller was aware, the buyer
may have a cause of action for fraud.' P. 582." See page 12 of the opposition brief. The plaintiffs
argue that a house the Smiths moved into in November of 1993 and that the Moores moved into in
May of 1994 was new when they moved in. But even if that preposterous position were true, what
difference would it make to their proof? They believe that it would eliminate the requirement that
they must have a home inspection in order to avoid caveat emptor. As shown below, that argument
fails. But at least the parties agree on this much, Plaintiffs must prove that the Smiths knew of
material, latent construction defects at that time they sold the house to the Plaintiffs.
The Smiths in section "C" of their moving brief at pages 23-26 alleged that the Plaintiffs had
not complied with the elements of their case in chief as mentioned above, that is, proof of latent
defects of which the Smiths were aware. The plaintiffs only opposed this argument by claiming
without support that "virtually" and "almost all of the 42 violations would not be apparent to the
ordinary buyer without specialized knowledge in construction. . . ." This argument ignores the
undisputed facts. First, Plaintiffs have by response to requests for admissions admitted that of the
42 alleged defects all but items 9, 26, 27, 38, 39 and 12 are not latent defects. Thus, only six
defects survive this first threshold of summary judgment. All the rest, not qualifying as latent
defects, must be dismissed. Plaintiffs try to give some unintelligible explanation for why they
admitted that 36 defects were not latent. However, the request for admission is plain. It referred
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to the definition of the phrase "latent defect" as used "in the court's order regarding the Smiths'
motion for summary judgment." Therefore, 36 of the 42 alleged defects are not of the type of defect
that could survive summary judgment according to the court's previous order.
Of the six items remaining only items 9,26 and 27 are material. The other three are so minor
that if they survive summary judgment they will not justify a rescission. Therefore, only 9, 26 and
27 will be discussed. Item 9 concerns whether there was a defect in the flashing. It is undisputed
that Dan Smith believes there is no defect and that he has no knowledge of a defect in the flashing.
It is undisputed that the inspector has concluded there is no defect in the flashing and that the small
amount of water comes from condensation on the windows. It is undisputed that the building
inspector saw the flashing or felt paper when he performed his inspection. It is also undisputed that
the Plaintiffs' experts have performed no destructive testing of the windows to determine the nature
of any flashing defect. The only disputed fact is this. It is Plaintiffs experts' opinion simply that
since there is some small evidence of water there must be a defect in the flashing. That falls far
short of evidence that Dan Smith knew of a defect in flashing when he built the house. That issue
cannot go to trial.
Item 26 concerns the span lengths of the floor joists. Jack Peterson testified to the allowable
span of a joist as 13 feet one inch. He also testified that he provided home builders with a sheet of
paper that showed among other things the maximum length of floor joists. This was exhibit 3 to his
deposition and is annexed hereto as exhibit 18. It is undisputed that Jack Peterson measured the
spans and found them to be code compliant. It is undisputed that Peterson passed that item off on

11

his inspection. How then could Dan Smith have known of a defect when the building inspector says
there was no defect?
Item 27, as shown before, was also a matter known by Jack Peterson who allowed a
Certificate of Occupancy without technical compliance.
III.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT REBUTTED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

DEFENSE.
Plaintiffs do not respond to the substance of the Smiths' arguments on the statute of
limitations. They make two points only, both of which are glaringly erroneous. First, they argue
that this defense had been defeated in a previous motion for summary judgment. Exhibit 3 to the
memo in support of summary judgment is the order granting in part and denying part the Smiths'
previous motion for summary judgment. The court at page 3 of the order specifically stated: "The
Court will consider, at the close of all discovery, a motion for summary judgment by Defendants,
based on their limitations defense."
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the discovery rule applies to the statute of limitations. That is
true under certain circumstances that may not exist in this case (See the BYU case discussed below)
but Plaintiffs erroneously argue that they, as a matter of law, discovered the defects only upon
receiving their expert's report of alleged code violations. It is not when the expert gives the opinion
that governs the start of the limitations period. It is when the plaintiff learns of a condition that may
or may not be caused by a construction defect. The plaintiff is then placed on inquiry notice to find
out what caused the damage. Otherwise, a Plaintiff could delay the running of the limitations period
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indefinitely until he or she got around to getting an expert report.
Apparently in the one case presented to the Utah appellate courts asking for the application
of the discovery rule to a construction defect, the court decided that the discovery rule was not
applicable. See BYU v. Paulsen Construction Co, 744 P. 2d 1370 (Utah 1987) discussed below.
But in a case alleging that the government destroyed mining rights and did damage to real property,
Dahl v. US, 155 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (CD. Utah 2001), the court succinctly explained the discovery
rule in Utah:
Under the discovery accrual rule, if an injury is such that it should
reasonably be discovered at the time it occurs, then a plaintiff should
be charged with the discovery of the injury, and the limitations period
should commence, at that time. But if, on the other hand, the injury
is not of the sort that can readily be discovered when it occurs, then
the action will accrue, and the limitations period commence, only
when the plaintiff has discovered, or with due diligence should have
discovered, the injury. Accrual is the date on which the statute of
limitations begins to run. It is not the date on which the wrong that
injures the plaintiff occurs, but the date, often the same but
sometimes later, on which the plaintiff discovers that he has been
injured.

Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., 749 A. 2d 796 (MD App. 2000) is a recent case
applying the discovery rule to a construction defect case. In Lumsden a homeowner saw his
driveway crack in October after an ice clearing company salted it down. The following August he
discovered that the cracks were not the ice clearing company's fault, but instead the driveway had
been installed with poor concrete. The two-year Maryland statute of limitation against the builder
of the driveway for breach of warranty began to run when the homeowner first discovered the
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cracks. The court described the law regarding inquiry notice and the discovery rule:
Under the discovery rule for a statute of limitation, a claimant reasonably
should know of a wrong if the claimant has knowledge of circumstances
which ought to have put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry, which
would charge the claimant with notice of all facts which such an
investigation would in all probability have disclosed.
In other words, under the discovery rule, a statute of limitations begins to run when a claimant gains
knowledge sufficient to put him on inquiry notice; from that date forward he will be charged with
knowledge of facts that would have been disclosed by a reasonable investigation. Thus the
homeowner was charged with inquiry notice when he saw the cracks, and the statute of limitations
began to run at the same time. Thus, in this case when the Moores first saw water damage and
cracking in the foundation and curling roof tiles they were then charged with the knowledge they
later gained upon learning of the expert's reports.
In BYU v. Paulsen Construction Co, 744 P. 2d 1370 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court
discussed the discovery rule:
The general rule in Utah is that "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause
of action does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations.1' Becton
Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983); Myers v.
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). '
. . . .We find nothing in the present case that warrants use of the discovery
rule. The six-year period of limitation expired on BYU's cause of action
against Paulsen on November 1, 1982. It is undisputed that BYU discovered
the leakage and improper pipe insulation no later than May of 1979. Unlike
the plaintiffs mMyers, BYU knew of its cause of action against Paulsen three
and a half years before the limitation period expired. The discovery rule has
no application when an action easily could have been filed between the date
of discovery and the end of the limitation period.
The court implied that the discovery rule could be applied where equitable circumstances demanded
14

it but found none in that case. Thus, all damage that Mary Moore discovered in the few years after
her purchase of the house started the statute of limitations running. There was thus no need for the
application of the discovery rule. Mere ignorance, whether intentional or not, does not suspend the
running of the statute.
In Buck v. Miles, 971 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1999), the Hawai'i Supreme Court rejected (in the
context of a medical malpractice action) the exact argument being made by the Plaintiffs here. In
Buck, the plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion for summary judgment
- the motion was granted, in part, on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to file her complaint
within the two year statute of limitations. Plaintiff based her appeal on the argument that the statute
of limitations was tolled until she was able to secure a favorable expert opinion supporting her
claims. Buckat718-719. Indeed, she argued that her'"subjective, unsubstantiated belief that she
had a cause of action . . . [was] insufficient to trigger the statute of limitations." Buck at 722. The
Hawai'i Supreme Court unequivocally rejected the plaintiffs arguments, stating:
[I]t is clear from the language of the statute and from the Hawai'i Supreme Court's
language in Yamaguchi that the statute of limitations is triggered by the plaintiffs
knowledge, not by [her] counsel's investigation.
Buck at 720. Moreover, the Buck court concluded by holding that:
None of our cases support [plaintiffs] contention. For a cause of action to accrue,
and thus the statute of limitations to commence . . ., legal knowledge of the
defendant's negligence is not required. Under the discovery rule, a plaintiff need
only have factual knowledge of the elements necessary for an actionable claim.
Thus, contrary to [plaintiffs] contention, an expert opinion validating the legal basis
for a claim is not required in order to trigger the running of the statute of limitations
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Buck at 722 - 723 (citations omitted).
If the discovery rule applies, the limitations period began to run when Mary Moore and her
late husband found out about the damage they are alleging in this case. As shown in the opening
brief there is no substantial damage to this house. In best case scenario for Plaintiffs there are a few
technical code violations, but they do not arise to the level of a construction defect. Still, although
the damage is slight it is this slight damage that has given birth to this huge lawsuit. Therefore,
notice of slight damage is notice sufficient to start the limitations running.
Thus, the Plaintiffs have not even attempted to dispute the knowledge of damage that Mary
Moore admittedly received and when she received it. Their only opposition centers around the
argument she could not have understood that the damage was caused by a code violation. The
plaintiffs would have the court ignore the undisputed facts that Mary Moore knew of slight water
damage at the window sills (there has been no substantial damage caused by water intrusion), knew
that the concrete footings were exposed (there has been no damage to the footings), knew there was
a small crack in the foundation (there is again no substantial damage) knew there were some bad
roof shingles (a part of the roof over the garage was replaced even though there were never any
leaks), and knew there were insufficient smoke detectors and knew these conditions existed shortly
after she bought the house. As shown in the moving memorandum, these conditions were known
to Mary Moore some five years before she found out from her expert report that there may have been
a code violation involved with this slight damage. As a matter of law, the statute begins to run upon
inquiry notice to the plaintiff, not upon the report of an expert.

16

IV.

PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO OBTAIN A HOME INSPECTION FOR $60 REQUIRES

DISMISSAL OF THEIR CLAIMS.
Plaintiffs argue they had no duty to obtain a reasonable home inspection under Maack, supra,
because they purchased a new home not a used home. It seems that these plaintiffs continually
assert frivolous legal positions based on strained definitions. They argue that "latent defect" means
something different when they responded to the Smiths' requests for admission from what it means
in the Judge's order and in the cases discussing construction defects. This willingness to torture
definitions is on display again here where they argue that a used house only becomes used if
someone other than the builder lives in it. Thus, under their definition, if the Smiths had lived in the
house for six years instead of six months, the house would still be new because no third party had
lived in the house.
They argue that a house is not used after it has been lived in for five months. This strain is
eased by slight of hand. They never mention that the Smiths moved into the home in November and
that the Moores moved in six months later in May, 1994. They simply talk about the signing of the
purchase contract in February 14, 1994. Even then they don't mention that the Smiths have lived
in the house since before Thanksgiving. They act as though the date of the certificate of occupancy
was the date the Smiths moved in when they know better. The final inspection took place on
November 8,1993. See exhibit 5 to the Peterson deposition annexed hereto as exhibit 19. See also
the testimony of Jack Peterson at page 23 of his deposition annexed hereto as exhibit 20. The
defendants moved in shortly thereafter.
17

Even if this were not a used house, where is the law that says that caveat emptor does not
apply to this particular sale? There is no citation to authority other than to a quote that there has
been some erosion of caveat emptor in new housing. The extent of that erosion has not been
explained by the Plaintiffs by any citation to authority. Is it tract housing that is now exempt from
caveat emptor? Homes built with a specific buyer in mind? Custom homes? Spec homes? Homes
over six months old? Who knows? The plaintiffs have never told us. If they had any authority in
Utah they would have cited it. It appears that the erosion may be a movement in other states but
Utah still observes caveat emptor.
The Plaintiffs, impliedly acknowledging the continuing effectiveness of the Maack case,
argues for its distinction here. They say that in Maack the house had been lived in for more than one
year by a party other than an owner builder. They don't say where Maack suggests the validity of
such a distinction. Maack simply says that where caveat emptor applies, as in Utah, it requires the
purchaser to obtain a reasonable home inspection. As shown in the moving brief, a home inspection
costing $60 and taking about an hour of time revealed the alleged code violations. That is not a big
burden to place on a prospective homeowner. If they are going to be picky about ambiguous, hypertechnical code violations, they should get a home inspector. If they are going to now challenge the
building inspector's right to issue a certificate of occupancy, then they should have gotten an
independent inspection.
V,

CONCLUSION
The material facts are not disputed. Plaintiffs have admitted that 36 of the 42 alleged code
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violations were not latent. They have not disputed the facts that they knew of the slight damage to
their home, of which they now complain, within the first year of living there. Therefore, the statute
of limitations has run. Finally, Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the Maack case but fail to do so.
Maack clearly holds that where a buyer fails to obtain a reasonable home inspection prior to
purchase, they are as a matter of law unable to prove that they acted in reasonable reliance on the
alleged failure to disclose of the homeowner. Under all three of these theories, the Smiths prevail
as a matter of law. The court should put an end to the financial hemorrhaging caused by this
frivolous lawsuit.
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61

11

Q. Southwest or northwest?

2

A. West, not southwest or northwest but west.

31

Q. I believe it is your contention that you have built

4

Mary Moore's home for the purpose of you and Carol living in

5

it, is that correct?

61

A, We built it for our use yes.

71

Q. What do you mean by "your use"?

8

A. We intended on staying in Fillmore and that is the

9

reason we built the home.

10

Q. So for "your use" means to occupy it?

11

A. Yes.

12

Q. Was it a retirement home or was that the intention?

13

A. Yes.

14

Q. When did you move into the home?

151

A. A week before Thanksgiving in 1993.

16

Q. And when did you move out of the home?

171

A. The end of March of 1994.

18

Q. What happened to the retirement in this home plan

19 between Thanksgiving of 1993 and March of 1994?
20

A. My son who was in medical school just finishing up his

21 residency asked us if we would go to Cedar City and build him a
22 new home.
23

Q. When did he ask you that?

24

A. Probably in January of 1994.

25

Q. Where was he living at the time?

Gregory B. Hadley (3652)
James K. Haslam (6887)
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200
Provo Utah 84604
Telephone (801) 377-4403
Facsimile: (801)377-4411
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)
:ss.
)

Mary Moore, having first been duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one, and I have personal knowledge of the

matters stated herein except as to any matter stated on information and belief only.
2.

I am a named plaintiff in the above-encaptioned case.

3.

In February of 1994, my husband, William Moore, and I entered into an

agreement to purchase a home from Dan and Carol Smith.
4.

We closed that transaction on May 2,1994.

5.

The Smiths were paid a total of $83,000.00 for the sale of the home.

6.

The home was intended to be the final home for me and my husband,

who is retired.
7.

Neither my husband nor I have ever been a contractor or engineer, nor do

we have any special knowledge concerning building codes, home construction, safety
inspections, or anything like that.
8.

Despite the fact that Dan Smith had built the home just a few months

before selling it to us, he did not ever disclose the fact that the home contained certain
defects, not in compliance with the applicable building code, rendering the home unsafe
for human occupancy.
9.

In deciding to purchase the relatively new home, my husband and I relied

upon the certificate of occupancy, which had been issued by the City of Filimore in
January of 1994, along with Dan Smith's representations that he was selling us
improved, residential real property, safe for occupancy.
10.

Although my husband and I visually inspected the property, the defects

and problems that have subsequently been discovered were not of the kind that such
an inspection would have revealed to us.
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11.

We subsequently took possession of the home, landscaped the yard, and

have generally maintained the home since that time.
12.

A little more than six years after the purchase, my husband and I had

retained a company to install a fence on our property.
13.

On May 16, 2000, when the fence workers were digging holes and putting

in poles for the fence next to the home, the workers called my attention to the fact that
the home's foundation was not the proper depth into the ground.
14.

That same day, I contacted the City of Fillmore to find out what the

requirements were for foundation depth and learned that our home's foundation was
not deep enough into the ground.
15.

I became deeply concerned over this information and retained a

contractor to determine what would be required to fix the problem.
16.

On August 5, 2000, Ken Zeigler of Ken Zeigler Co. came to our home to

determine what would need to be done to fix the foundation.
17.

At that time, Mr. Zeigler informed me that he would require that we first

obtain a safety inspection and recommended that we use Jason Bullock of Sunrise
Engineering, Inc. for that purpose.
18.

On August 8, 2000, Mr. Bullock came to our home and performed a safety

inspection.
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25.

I do not believe that we have yet discovered all of the significant defects in

the construction of our home, and my husband and I are attempting to obtain the funds
to hire an engineer to conduct a complete inspection and to provide a detailed report.
26.

I do not believe that my husband and 1 could have discovered these

structural defects prior to August of 2000.
27.

Unless my husband and I can obtain some relief through this court action,

we will likely not be able to pay to have the defects corrected, or to sell the home for
anything close to what we paid for the home, and we currently have no other place to
live.
DATED this /«?

day of March, 2001.

K

<nn*u[ V ? / / v ^

Mary Moore
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Mary Moore, this

/ a . day of

March, 2001.
^

Notary Public
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be mailed by U.S. mail, first class, postage
prepaid, the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MARY MOORE this / j
to the following:
A. Bryce Dixon
Nathan K. Fisher
Dixon & Truman
192 East 200 North, Suite 203
St. George, Utah 84770
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day of March, 2001,

INHIBIT
U S DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT

SETTLEMENT STATEMENT

Form Approved OMB No. 2502 0265

Type of Loan

D FHA
D VA

a FmHA 3 D Conv Unlns
D Conv Ins.

6 File Number
29827-M

7 Loan Number

8 Mortgage Insurance Case Nun

Note This form is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by the settlement agent are she
Hems marked "(poc)" were paid outside the closing, they are shown here (or informaljanaj guxaaseA sxul a/e. oal tod/id/L,.
the totals.
Name and Address of Borrower
E. Name and Address of Seller
F Name and Address of Lender

liam K. Moore
y J . Moore
it Rt- Box 234
lmore, Ut. 8461]

Dan Irvin Smith
Carol L. Smith
P.O. 985
Fillmore, Ut. 84631
H Settlement Agent

Property Location

ated in
lmore, Ut. 84631

{SECURITY TITLF COMPANY OF MILLARD COUNTY
I Settlement Date
Place of Settlement
(P.O. BOX 658

t of Lot 6, Blk. 32, Plat A, Fillmore
y Survey.

Fillmore, Utah

Summary of Borrower's Transaction
Gross Amount Due From Borrower
83,000.00
Contract sales price
2 Personal property
164.60
3 Settlement charges to borrower (line 1400}
4
5
Adjustments for items paid by seller In advance
6 City/town taxes
to
7 County taxes
to
8 Assessments
to
o
0
1
2
O Qroia Amount Due From Borrower
0 Amounts Paid By Or In Behalf Of Borrower
1 Deposit or earnest money
2 Principal amount of new loan(s)
3 Existing loan(s} taken subject to
4
5

83,164 B0
4,000,00

,
6
9
Adjustments for items unpaid by seller
0 City/town taxes
to
1 County taxes
1/m/94o
5/09/94
2 Assessments
to
3
4
5
6
7
B
9
O. Total Paid By/For Borrower
10 Cash At Settlement From/To Borrowr
1 Gross amount due from borrower (tine 120)
i2 Less amounts paid by/for borrower (line 2201
13 Cash

D From

• To Borrower | «\

191.71

K

//)/??// n

/DAM,

5/02/94

Summary of Seller's Transaction

400 Gross Amount Due To Seller
83,000.00
401 Contract sales price
402 Personal property
403
404
405
Adjustments for Items paid by teller In advance
408 Crty/town taxes
to
407 County taxes
to
408 Assessments
to
409
410
411
412
420

Gross Amount Due To Seller

500
501
502
503
504
505
508
507
508
509

Reductions In Amount Due To Seller
Excess deposit (see instructions)
Settlement charges to seller (line 1400)
Existing loan(s) taken subject to
Payoff of first mortgage loan
Payoff of second mortgage loan

Adjustment* for items unpaid by setter
510 City/town taxes
to
511 County taxes 1 / m /q4to S/0?
512 Assessments
to
513
514
515
SIQTnrvte A p p l i * ! f n ?Qft4K-M
517
518
519

4,1*3.71

HJ,lb4.fc0

78,9709

520. Total Reduction Amount Due Seller

83,000,00
4.000.00
629.00

19^ 71

Q ^ f l 17

14,580,88

BOO Cash At Settlement To/From Seller
UJ,UOU.OO
601 Gross amount due to setter (ttne 420)
602 Less reductions In amt due seller (line 520)| j * 4 ^ ® U ; ^ 8 )
603

u To
"ftr»*E

c aft

SELLERS

fERS:

84631

w

j

fP

From jailer

8,419 12

i25

1 (R«y 7/e

C&it£j J-mld, \)^t(,<

11.
K3.
)1.
>2
~

1J3.

_

% 1

/day

per month
per month
per month
per month
par month
per month
per month
per month

Company

75.00

75.00

rnrnp^ny

K nr\

7*; nn

Conparr'

529 00

_.

Government Recording and Transfer Charges
; Mortgage ff). Of)
Recording fees: Deed$ 15. OH
City/county tax/stamps: Deeds
; Mortgage $
; Mortgage $
State tax/stsmps: PeedS

; Release $), 00

204.
206.
300. Additional Settlement Charges to
301. Survey
302. Pest Inspection to
F n i m n r p l ^ f ^ r t k p r g *«:~r»r.
303.T3fAr Sl-nrV Pft-lsSUP FPP
304^ qq 4 U^fr. r ^ s ^ ^ " ^ " ^
F U l T m r p Water llsprs ftssnr305.
400. Total Settlement Chargas (enter on lines 103, Section J and 502, Section K)

TfERS INITIALS

Paid From
Seller's
Funds at
Settlement

;

Items Required By Lander To Ba Paid In Advance
& S
Interest from
to
months to
Mortgage Insurance Premium for
years to
Hazard Insurance Premium for
years to

>5. _____
>00. Reserves Deposited Wlth Lender
months <5> $
)01. Hazard Insurance
months© S
K)2. Mortgage Insurance
months @ $
>03. City property taxes
months @ $
)04. County property taxes
months© S
)05. Annual assessments
months ® S
>06.
months © $
)07.
monthsjp S
M5
100. Title Charges
Security T i t l e
101. Settlement or closing fee
to
102. Abstract or title search
to
to
103. Title examination
to
104. Title insurance binder
105. Document preparation
to
R A — i r t t y TMt-"|A
to
108. Notary fees
to
107. Attorney's fees
(Includes above items' numbers:
to
"*S. Title Insurance
Sfl^urity T i t l o
(Includes above Items' numbers
109. Lender's coverage
$
S3.000.00
110. Owner's coveraqe
$
111.
112.
200.
201.
202.
203.

@

li)

Settlement Charges
)0 Total Salas/Brokers Commission based on price $
Division of Commission (Una 700) as follows.
)t. $
to
>2 $
to
)3. Commission paid at Settlement
U.
>Q. Hems Payable in Connactfon With Loan
) \, Loan Origination Fee _
>2. Loan Discount
>3. Appraisal Fee
)4, Credit Report
>S Lende^t Inspection Fee
>6. Mortgage Insurance Application Fee to
)7. Assumption Fee
)8
>9

iJjJljiL.

Wte±

SELLERS INITIALS:

•.i5.no

jn.nn

.39 fiO

164.60

629.00
1121-2 (Rev. 7/87)

GENERAL CONDITIONS
HANDLING OF FUNDS AND DOCUMENTS; Deposit all funds in connection with this
escrow in any of our escrow accounts in any federally insured depository selected by you and
disburse same by the issuance of checks from said account Pay encumbrances in accordance
with this agreement, prorate all agreed items, and record such escrowed instruments as are
necessary or proper for commission, and disburse balance of escrowed funds to the party or
parties entitled thereto If sale be based on contract of sale, deliver such contract and all related
instruments to designated escrow collection agent Cause fire insurance policies to show the
interest of the respective parties after closing sale. You are hereby relieved of any obligation to
determine if fire insurance policy is in force and its premium paid.
TAXES AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS: It is understood that property taxes are assessed
and interest on special assessments is charged on a calendar year basis. You are therefore
instructed to make ail prorations thereof on that basis. In prorating taxes, if the amount of the
current year's taxes be unknown, use prior year's taxes as a basis. You are hereby released
from any and uli liability which could arise by reason of any variance between the amount
payable in taxes on the year of closing and on the said prior year. If parcel being sold be a
portion of a larger tract and no separate tax assessment is available therefor, no proration
shall be required to be made in escrow the Buyer and Seller hereby agreeing that they will
adjust the proration of taxes between themselves. You are to make no proration of unpaid
principal of special assessments unless specifically instructed to do so. You shall have no
assessment as may be reported by the various municipal offices involved.
PRORATIONS: Before prorating items relating to existing encumbrances and in accounting
(or assumed obligations and impounded reserves, obtain from agent or individual making
collections thereon all needed information, including rate of interest, payment terms and existing balances. You are instructed to use information in making required prorations and effecting sef tlcment between the parties and are hereby released from any liability or responsibility
should the information furnished to and used by you prove to be incorrect.
CANCELLATION OR AMENDMENT: This escrow may not be cancelled or its terms modified without consent of all the parties hereto. Should either party to this escrow elect to cancel
the same, you are instructed to notify forthwith the remaining parties by mailing written
notice of said election to them and the real estate agent at their last known address. In the
event of cancellation, all documents are to be returned to the respective parties who shall have
deposited same with you. If cancellation occurs because of the default of seller and not of buyer,
you are instructed to refund to buyer all funds escrowed by him, after deducting your charges
and expenses. However, if cancellation is occasioned by default of buyer and not of seller, you
are authorized to pay to seller buyer's escrowed earnest money, which shall be forfeited to seller
and treated as liquidated damages. In the event you have documents executed by both buyer
and seller, you shall cancel same by marking with the word "void," retaining said documents
in your files.
Failure to close this escrow within the period hereinabove provided shall not automatically
terminate or cancel same. You may continue to regard it as executory until notified to the
contrary in writing by any of the parties hereto. Should a dispute or controversy arise between
buyer and seller, you shall hold all monies and documents until such a time as existing differences shall have been resolved through compromise or a final judicial determination had of the
rights of the parties. In the event you interplead you may deposit the documents and funds in
court, deducting all your charges and expenses incurred, including reasonable attorney's fees
and you will thereupon be relieved of further liability or responsibility in connection with this
escrow. The parties hereto agree to save you harmless, in the event of any such disagreement
between the parties, against all liability, costs, damages, expenses and attorney's fees that
may arise or which may be incurred or sustained by you by reason hereof
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General Conditions

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS: Parties hereto agree that SECURITY TITLE COMPANY,
assumes no responsibility or liability of unrecorded tax or mechanic's liens, personal property
taxes, mining locations, rights of parties in possession of the premises, surveys, location of
improvement or boundary lines, use of property in compliance with zoning ordinances or
restrictions and such other matters as are excepted under Schedule "B" of the standard form
policy or title insurance. It is further agreed that SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, makes no
representation as to the sufficiency or validity of the documents deposited herewith nor makes
any representations as to the value, quantity, or condition of the property described herein. In
the event sale includes furniture or other personal property, it is understood and agreed that
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY has made no search of the records for chattel mortgages or
conditional sales contracts and does not certify as to title thereto, and buyer accepts the bill of
sale with understanding. Parties hereto further agree that SECURITY TITLE COMPANY
assumes no liability for and is expressly released from any claim or claims whatsoever in
connection with the receiving, retaining, and delivering of the above papers, except to account
for payments made thereon, from which it is authorized to deduct its customary collection
charges and expenses, together with any amount which may be required to pay costs, attorney
fees and other legal expenses by reason of any litigation or controversy which may arise in
connection herewith.
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, as ESCROW AGENT and ESCROWEE, assumes no responsibility for determining that the parties to this escrow have complied with the requirements of
the Truth in Lending, Consumer Credit Protection Act, (Public Law 90-321), Utah Consumer
Credit Code, or similar laws.

ADDITION TO GENERAL .CONDITIONS
DISCLOSURE OF TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS: I n t e r n a l Revenue Code
S e c t i o n 6109(h) imposes requirements for f u r n i s h i n g ,
disclosing,
and
i n c l u d i n g taxpayer i d e n t i f i c a t i o n numbers i n tax r e t u r n s on the p a r t i e s t o
a r e s i d e n t i a l real . s t a t e transaction involving seller-provided financing,
S c l ^ l . n M ? 1 d ! ! , t M i t h a t th.6 d i 8 c l o ™ r « r e p o r t i n g requirements are
e x c l u s i v e o b l i g a t i o n s between the p a r t i e s to t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n and t h a t
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY i s
not o b l i g a t e d
to
transmit
the
t L P 5 «
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n numbers t o the I n t e r n a l Revenue S e r v i c e or t o the p a r t i e s
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY i s not r e n d e r i n g an o p i n i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e e f r e c t of
t h i s law on t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n , and t h e p a r t i e s are not a c t i n g ' on any
s t a t e m e n t s made or omitted by the escrow or c l o s i n g o f f i c e r .
To f a c i l i t a t e compliance w i t h t h i s l a w . the p a r t i e s t o t h i s escrow hereby
identifi^,^^CURITY -TITLE
COMPANY to
release
any p a r t y ' s
taxpayer
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n number t o any r e q u e s t i n g p a r t y who i s a p a r t y t o t h i s
transaction.
The r e q u e s t i n g party s h a l l d e l i v e r a w r i t t e n r e q u e s t t o
escrow.
The p a r t i e s h e r e t o waive a l l r i g h t s of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r e g a r d i n g
m 5 S
IS/«r
numbers

v

t S
t
? a y e r l d ! n t i f l c a t i o * ™ * b « r * • « * agree t o hold SECURITx
^ , harmless a g a i n s t any f e e s , c o s t s , or judgments i n c u r r e d
e j e c t i o n w i t h t h e , r e l e a s e of taxpayer i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
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A
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INSPECTION

BUILDING
PERMIT
YOU
THE FOLLOWING
STEPSz

Provide
2 comple*te sets
and
3 plot
plans
to
the
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D e
s e t s
M U S T
i n c l
basement or foundation plan, (see
and pertinent code requirements).

p a r t m e n t .
T h e s e
a a d e :
floor plan, elevations, wall sections,
attached sheets for example drawings
Minimum S c a l e 1/4" - l 1
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Inspection
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I n s p e c t i o n
cess
usually
vgreeic

P u r c h a s e
t h e
P e r m i t s
B u i l d i n g
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C O M M E R C I A L
S T E P S
T H A T

)
f r o m
t
h e
D e p a r t m e n t .
t h i s
t i m e . )

P L A N S
H A V E
SOME
A D D I T I O N A L
R E Q U I R E
MORE
T I M E .

1.
2.

A r c h i t e c t a n d / o r E n g i n e e r stamps may a l s o b e r e q u i r e d .
A c o n t r a c t o r s l i c e n s e i s r e q u i r e d e x c e p t when a home owner w o r k s on
h i s / h e r own r e s i d e n c e .

A

B U I L D I N G

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

All
All
All
All
All

P E R M I T

I S

R E Q U I R E D

P O R r

new s t r u c t u r e s and a d d i t i o n s t o e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e s
a c c e s s o r y b u i l d i n g s , s t o r a g e , g a r a g e , e t c i n e x c e s s of 120 s q f t .
f e n c e s more t h a n 6 f i n h e i g h t
r e t a i n i n g w a l l s more t h a n 4 ' i n h e i g h t measured from b o t t o m of f t g ,
r e m o d e l work t h a t i s n o t m a i n t e n a n c e .

!*Ois

This check list should be used in conjunction with the sample drawings to
assist you in preparing a set of drawings for your penait application. Be
sure that all requirements are clearly shown on your plans. Plans must be
drawn on unlined or graph paper with a straight edge, minimum 8£ n x 11" size.
1. Concrete:"3000 # PSI, S 1/2 bag mix,
2. Footings: Provo City recomnends a 10ff x 20" footing
with 2 #4 bars continuous.
3. Foundations: #4 bars 24" o.c. each way with a 30" dowel,
from footing to foundation every 24". Show dimensions of
foundation wall.
4. * Frost level protection for footings: 30" earth coverage
show earth to wood clearance.
5. Show dimensions of building rooms and doors.
6. Show.set backs on plot plan^ lot dimensions.
7. Foundation: Minimum of 6tf above final grade.
8. Redwood plates are required on concrete.
9. Anchor bolts: 1/2" x 10"- 6 feet on center with a minimum
of 2 anchors per piece.
10. Provide combustion air to the furnace.
11. Provide a floor drain by the water heater.
12. Show location: Electric meter and service panel.
13. Show GFI protection on receptacles in baths, garages and on
outside plugs.
14. Show location of electrical lights-££-), switches-(^), and
outlets- (=©3: minimum of one outlet every 12 feet of wall space.
15. Bedroom windows: 4° 3* minimum window sills: 44" maximum height
from finished floor.
16. Windows within 18" of floor, 18" or wider-tempered or protected.
17. V/indow size: Minimum 10% floor area - 501 operable.
18. Brick ties: 16" o.c. each way - 1" x 22 gauge.
19. Attic access required: 22" x 30" minimum
20. Water closet/shower: 30" minimum required dimensions
21. Vent fan required in baths without windows.
22. Studs- 16" o.c. or 24" o.c.
23.*CEILIKG~J0ISTS SPANS: 2 x 4 , 24" o.c. - 9f 8T max.
2 x 6 , 24" o.c. - 15T 2" max.
2 x 8 , 24" o.c. - 19f 11" max.
2 x 10, 24" o.c. - 251 5" max.
24.* ROOF RAFTER SPANS: 2
2
2
2

x 6 - 24" o.c.
x 8 - 24" o.c.
x 10- 24" o.c.
x 12- 24" o.c.

-

25.* FLOOR JOIST SPANS: 2 x 8 , 16" o.c. 2 x 8 , 24" o.c. 2 x 10, 16" o.c2 x 10, 24" o.c2 x 12, 16" o.c2 x 12, 24" o.c-

91 2" max.
12' 1" max.
15! 5" max.
18l 9" max.

13' 1" max.
11f 5" max.
16f 9" max.
14! 7" max.
201 4" max.
17' 9" max.

26.* HEADER SIZES: 4 x 4 - 4 ' span
4 x 6 - 4'to 61 span
4 x 8 - 6! to 81 span
On edge if tv.r> pieces
*A11 spans are based on Douglas Fir £2 or better.*
27.

Solid blocking between joists over all bearing points-

2829.
30.
JUL
52.
33.

34.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

C e i l i n g / f l o o r headroom: 7 1 6 n minimum
All S t a i r s : 6 f 6 , f minimum headroom.
All S t a i r s : 7 1/2 r i s e max - 10M run minimum.
.All S t a i r s : 50M - 34M h a n d r a i l s , 56 u guardrails.
Shear bracing required on both s i d e s of each corner and
every 25 ! l i n e a l f e e t .
I n s u l a t i o n : All e x t e r i o r walls R - l l , ceilings R-19 double
glazed windows: Basement and crawl space also must be
insulated.
Crawl space v e n t s required: 1 1/2 sq. f t . per every 25 l i n e a l
feet.
Crawl space a c c e s s : 18" x 24,f minimum.
A t t i c vents r e q u i r e d : 1/lSOth of f l o o r area.
Hearth: 20" minimum in f r o n t , 12" each side of opening.
Chimney c a p : 4 ft minimum with d r i p edge.
One hour f i r e w a l l with s e l f - c l o s i n g door between house
and garage.
Smoke d e t e c t o r s recuired i n bedroom access a r e a s . Interconnect i f m u l t i
Show: mechanical, plumbing and h e a t i n g f i x t u r e s .
Roof coverings.
Roof decking
Floor decking
Exterior s i d i n g or covering
I n t e r i o r wall and c e i l i n g covering
Carports: 12 n s o f f i t or use e x t e r i o r grade plywood or
use exterior, grade gypboard.
48.Method of attachment
49. Type of footing and dimensions
50. Size and spacing of supports
51. Size and span of beam

The circled numbers r e f e r t o the preceding l i s t . They i n d i c a t e t h e t y p i c a l
location of the plans for the appropriate statement explaining conzrtrucfcion
d e t a i l s , i . e . What the building i s made of (materials), i t s s i z e
(dimensions), and any special methods of construction (technique).
THE NUMBERED CIRCLES ARE FOR EXAMPLES ONLY, YOU
MAY NEED MORE INFORMATION. CAREFULLY CHECK THE REQUIRHvENT
LIST AND INCLUDE ALL REQUIREvfEhTS ON YOUR PLANS,
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The circled numbers refer to the preceding list.
They indicate the typical location of the plans
for the appropriate statement.explaining
construction details. i.e. What the building
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L. Jack Peterson
95 East 500 South
P O Box 84
Fillmore, Utah 84631

Y

To whom it may concern
[ was contacted by Dan Smith and went over the property and the layout of the home on
the 1 I of August 1993, and inspected the footings on Friday 13 th It was called to his attention
at that time that the footings were not at proper depth, but he staled this would be taken care of
when the back till was put around the house The basement walls were inspected on the 16th and
the rough plumbing on the 18th, The rough electrical and plumbing, along with the framing
inspection, was done on the 8th and 9th of September 1993. I checked the building progress on
both the 28th and the 29th of October I also visited the job site another occasion and Dan and I
discussed the venting of the attic Dan felt that it was adequate.
Dan and Carol were living in the home when we asked to do the final inspection on the
home on the 8th of November. At that time they hadn't built the deck on the back of the house
and the final grading hadn't been done as well. At the time the final inspection was done, I
discussed with Dan the fact that the access into the attic did not meet the minimum code
requirements and that the smoke detectors had not been installed.. None of these items had been
corrected at the time that the house was sold to the Moore's The Moore's did the landscaping
around the house not realizing that the back fill around the house did not meet the 30 inch depth
requirement.
th

Respectfully submittedl/y

^ l(jadc Peterson, Fillmore City Building Inspector

William Moore and Mary Moore vs Dan Smith, et al.
Deposition of L Jack Peterson, taken on February 20, 2003
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1

July 29th.

2
3

A.

permit, getting permits to do it.

4
5

I think this is when we were working on the

Q.

Okay.

Any other references to Dan Smith

that you found in there?
A.

7

one here.

8

Q.

Do you mind if we make a copy of that?

9

A.

I can make copies for you as quick as we get!

10

through.

11
12

Q.

Oh, it goes all the way through.

There ( s

6

I don't know whether that was electrical.
I

That would give you the dates.
Yeah, it would give us the dates.

I don't

know how that would do.

13

A.

It doesn't do a whole a lot.

14

planner if I have a problem I write down.

15

inspection was on November the 8th.

16

hadn't thrown this away.

I have a big
The final

I was surprised I

17

Q.

Where did you find that?

18

A.

I had it stuck in the tax box at home.

19

MR. HADLEY:

20

MR. DIXON:

There you go.

All right.

I think what we'll do, we'll

21

Q.

Love it.

22

call Exhibit 1 -- when you make a copy of that we'll

23

attach that as a exhibit as Exhibit 1.

24
25
l > « * S L * * * U « K « - 5 « " * « « **•***<•/& nr^tib"**"*

Copy of what do we call that, a day planner?
A.

Just a day planner.

«JS<-*?Wi>-f*«*«. j> 3*Mi*r*«»uav>>-6 A / W •*****.r/i' ^/*~*^>«-*<

v»^*?i,^<-*Sw*ili^S^rn^**>J*2M'<^<v*Z+*l'<t-*Z:

Robert Stanley Court Reporting, Inc.
Post Office Box 3079 St George, Utah 84771 (435)688-7844

ADDENDUM 3

£T

A. BRYCE DIXON, ESQ (#889)
AARON M. WAITE, ESQ (#8992)
DIXON, TRUMAN, BANGERTER & FISHER, P.C.
192 East 200 North, Suite 203
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (435) 652-8000
Facsimile: (435) 652-9000
Attorneys for Defendants

j>
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM MOORE and
MARY MOORE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

DAN SMITH, individually and as
Trustee of the Dan Irvin Smith
Inter Vivos Trust, and CAROL SMITH,
individually and as Trustee of the
Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
Defendants

REPLY MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON BREACH
OF CONTRACT CLAIMS

Civil No.: 000700142 MI
Judge: EYRE

THERE ARE NO ISSUES OF FACT. THE COURT NEED
ONLY INTERPRET THE CONTRACT
Plaintiffs have not raised an issue of fact. They contend that paragraph two is disputed.
However, Plaintiffs acknowledge in their opposition papers that the Court has already ruled that
Dan Smith built this home for his primary residence and that when he sold it to the Moores it was
a used home. Plaintiffs do not dispute the quoted provisions of the contract. The Plaintiffs only
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dispute the interpretation of the contract. This case is therefore ripe for summary judgment.

THE SMITHS RECEIVED NO NOTICE FROM THE
BUILDING INSPECTOR OF ANY BUILDING VIOLATION
Plaintiffs acknowledge that they have no contract claims except those arising under the
"Seller's Warranties" under paragraph "C" of the Earnest Money Agreement.1 That paragraph
provides as follows:
H C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no
claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property
which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing; . . . ( c ) the plumbing,
heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances
shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing.
Regarding clause "C(a)" they argue that the alleged laundry list of code deviations raised
by their experts constitute "building violations" and that Dan Smith had knowledge of these
"building violations" because he built the house as an owner-builder. They are wrong in this
interpretation of the contract.
Clause "C(a)" contemplates a situation where a builder's construction has been "redtagged" by a building inspector; in other words, the building inspector has notified the builder
that a certain deviation from code must be corrected. The builder must have received such a
"claim or notice" from the building inspector. If so, he must correct it prior to closing. Here,

1

Plaintiffs argue some vague notion of good faith and fair dealing but they offer no
specifics of how such a term was breached so it is not discussed in this brief.
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however, Dan Smith received a final inspection and a certificate of occupancy from Jack
Peterson, the building inspector. (Ex. 3, Certificate of Occupancy) Peterson never red-tagged
this home. (Ex. 1, Peterson depo. at 18,19) Therefore, Smith did not "receive a claim or notice
of any building . . . violation."
Plaintiffs' interpretation of clause "C(a)" is erroneous for the following five reasons:
1.

Plaintiffs' interpretation of this contract language presumes that every

deviation from code would be a "building violation" even the deviations where the building
inspector has specifically determined them to be insignificant from a structural or safety
standpoint and thus passed them off. If every code deviation were a "building violation", then
every builder would be liable to correct inconsequential deviations that come to light decades
after the construction of the house, even though the building inspector passed them off.
2.

If every code deviation were a "building violation," then every builder would

remain liable when the deviation has been presented to the building official who, under the
discretion granted him by the Uniform Building Code, waived strict compliance, Dan
Smith knew there were certain deviations from code in the construction of this house. But he
took care of them properly. Dan Smith called attention to the building inspector that the stairs
did not comply with the building code. The inspector considered the matter and waived strict
compliance. (Ex. 1, Peterson depo. at 66) Jack Peterson also considered the attic access, found it
a little small but found the deviation insignificant and so passed it off (Id. at 53) Similarly, the
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building inspector considered the amount of the roof ventilation and did not require Smith to
change the ventilation and passed it off. {Id. at 48)
Plaintiffs' interpretation thus assumes that Dan Smith has breached his contract where he
has knowledge of a building code deviation that the building inspector has expressly determined
not to be a building violation. Obviously, such an interpretation is outrageous. If it were
adopted, it would have vast, unexpected and disastrous consequences to home builders all over
the state of Utah.
3.

The word "receive" implies just this kind of notification from a building

inspector. One "receives" notice from another, not from himself One "receives " notice of a
building code violation from a building inspector. He may already know there is a violation but
he does not "receive a notice or claim" from himself.
4.

Plaintiffs' interpretation of clause "C(a)" runs counter to the plain language

of the rest of the agreement. Plaintiffs agreed under paragraph "IB" to buy a house "as is" and
with no warranties other than those in paragraph "C." Plaintiffs interpretation of paragraph "C"
would nullify this plain language. It would make every home seller liable for all conceivable
construction defects when the seller intends that the buyer is buying the house subject to all such
defects. That after all is the definition of "as is."2 Plaintiffs' faulty interpretation of this contract

2

The phrase "as is" in the real estate means the buyer takes subject to all existing
conditions and excludes breach of contract claims and warranties. 8 ALR 5th 312, § 9. Also see
Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc. 875 P.2d 570 (Ut App 1994).
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is thus: 'Plaintiffs take the house "as is", subject to all defects with the exception of
'

'

..,***:.

'

-

::".*•

all
^hMid/d.

In this contract under paragraph "1(e)" Plaintiffs acknowledged they inspected the house
to their satisfaction and accepted "it in its present physical conditio! 1.' " " I 'hey were given the
opportunity in n a r a ^ r - "6" to insist upon other warranties hi/

...*-.*•-*.!

(!u-; t,. ,-.k lor

"none." To accept Plaintiffs too broad interpretation of paragraph "C" would be to deny the

provisions of the contract
5.

Plaintiffs presume that Dan Smith knew the building code as they interpret it

and chose to deviate fi tin i c

nil .: <*•- Tit.", .. * . \- n.., \ u\c"< >• ..i «^-t ^resented in

this case. Without proof Plaintiffs simply assert that Dan Smith must have known of the alleged
code violations because he built homes m :->ait Lake L'Hy m tiK- i1; -\v

I In.- i., iaisc ior several

reason.
Some of the alleged code violations are based on interpretation of the code where the

building inspector gave to owner-builders the standard handout listing certain building code
icquiK-m- hi

;;

•-• i.^-i. uqn % ••: -.: • .„<i HCILU- .;. ;••..*! wi second Appendix ofExhibits,

as Ex. 2) (Ex. 1, Peterson depo at 26, 30) It stated that the maximum length of a floor joist was

3

uan bmmi Duilt over 200 homes in Salt Lake County in the 1970's. (Ex. 3, Dan Smith
depo at 25) He moved to Fillmore in 1979/1980 and became a dairy farmer. (Id. at 69,70)
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13 feet one inch. Plaintiffs' expert has stated by his interpretation of the code that the maximum
length

u
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proper and it was within the discretion of the building inspector to choose. (Ex. 4, Steenblik
depo. ai i iY>- i«M)j Ooes paragraph » mean nere mat U;in Mmtn is subject to liability lor
having notice of a building code violation if lie followed precisely what the building inspector
told him to do?
MurvP 11 •*'
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f
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' ' 4 ; iii,pv;ct:;i > .lie n c c e ^ . e A k w t i r ' i

always clear what the code requires. (Ex. 6, Barrett depo. at 25-27) There are code changes every
few years that could trip up any contractor, (U. at 2(\ ^.. • i, e_ . ii Dan Smith thought he was
complying because he built the home as he built it in Salt Lake Citv years before dees he h.w e
knowledge of a building code violation such that he has breached the contract? For example,
Dai 1. Si 111th did not 1: ealize the code had. cliai iged the 1 equii ei nent foi a staii ! landi ail. (Exhibit 5,
Smith depo. at 137, 138) The 1991 code allowed a straight handrail. The next code (1993)
required the handrail return and attach to the wall. Jack Peterson did not know about this
handrail change so he passed it off. (Exhibit 1, Peterson depo. at 52) i n w 'Minth eh.i: > e<! u ifh
actual knowledge of committing a code violation even though it is so recent that the building
m s p e c t e ' - {"">'• '

, ;•... , ; r

j

v

m l ' U, in

[,. lv

.. -

having remedied this code deviation prior to closing when he never realized it existed?
Moreover, Plamtitls accuse Dan Smith oi knowingly breaching the building code on the
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issue of attic ventilation. However, the building code provides that the amount of ventilation is
!'..( i!

'i m i n i . J >iMi "
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determined that Dan Smith complied. (Ex. 6, Barrett depo. at 36, 37) (Ex. 1, Peterson depo.at
18).
Clearly, the building code is not as black and white as Plaintiffs would lead the court to
believe. There is much discretion and interpretation left to the building inspector. That is why
l-.Jli'.d'

''

'

l

"

i.

*'K'i.!|,(

""

\

K-

••

M i l l ' l l l > p t L i*

red-tagged a code deviation.
Plaintiffs' strained interpretation ignores the tact that the building inspector, having
inspected, found compliance, or having exercised discretion where appropriate and or having
waived certain code deviations, granted final inspection and signed off on the certificate of
occi lpai ic)' Foi ai lother example, Jacl c Petei son says he exan lined ai id foi ind pi oper flashing at
the windows and passed that off. (Exhibit 1, Peterson depo. at 55). Plaintiffs' expert has never
done any destructive testing to see if there really is flashing but still alleges that there was no
flashing. (Ex. 7, itemization of alleged code deviations, item #9.) The Plaintiffs1 interniviati< >
the contract would require Dan Smith repair this "building violation." How could he have notice

contend that to avoid these anomalous scenarios mentioned above the contract phrase "notice or
ciauj.

..nisi De construed to mean that which comes from a buildiiig inspector.
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T H E A L L E G E D C O D E D E F E C T S DO NOT CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF THE
WARRANTY THAT THE ELECTRICAL, PLUMBING AND H V A C SYSTEMS WOULD
BE IN SOUND OR SATISFACTORY WORKING CONDITION AT C L O S I N G
The arguments made above apply for the most part to this section. Plaintiffs desire to

not belong and even though claims of such alleged defects were expressly waived by the
Plaintiffs in the contract.
One thing is very different. Under this clause ofth. -/onn.t, t

\\\.'

-hit ,• i

nature electrical, plumbing or heating and air-conditioning (HVAC) can apply. A review of the
lai mdi ) list (lb ;: 1 am ie.:? :ed hei et a.) sho .- ";s that • : nl> it "i i i.s 10 (cai ill :iiig of bathi ( >oi i i f ixtures), 15
(no water pressure reducing valves), 22 (strapping of water heater) 23-25, 29,30 (non- GFCI
circuits and failure to label electncal panel), S^^ (no outlet in basement) 35 (add grounding kit to
circuit breaker box) and 41, 42 ^luinhi*-!*

KTUUN

,t

n ivp<.-\

this contractual provision because these are the only items that relate to plumbing, electrical or
•

• .i

• • • . . ; .[iii.^-eu i • •!'. u.e eoniracuiaims

under paragraph "C(c)".
However, even these items do not give rise to a contract claim because they do not affect
the satisfactory working condition of the systems. The clause a t ' V d - r dm , • ~< w.mnui aj'ain^t
defects. It warrants that these three systems would be working at the time of closing. There is no
evuleP'

'l> ' !ii "
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Paue X
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i
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LLinswere

discovered over six years aucr me sale 01 UIL. nouse. i:\en now mere is no evidence that these
systems are not in sound working order. Mere deviations ixom code d o not necessarily mean that
the electrical or plumbing systems were not "working." If they were not "working" properly
I 'laintiffs w 01 i.lei ha\ e 1 ::i i :» -:,i ' i i. al:> ::in it it right aftei tl iej i nov ed in
In fact, as shown in the previous motion for summary judgment the only actual damage to
the house mat nainims nave suffered is some small water iiiti iisioii and buckling of some of the
roof shingles. There is no evidence of serious damage to the integrity of the house. There is no
allegation that the roof leaks. (See Ex.8, Moore depo at 20.) There is no known damage to
footings or found •>

\W!*MV

*'*» ]\i\.u\

u - ^ K -. * -• , vl_

evidence of electrical blackouts, no evidence of heating or air conditioning failure. There was no
breach of clause "C(c)" at the tii lie of the closing and there has been no such, breach since.
The only alleged defect that Plaintiffs attempted to bring within the scope of clause
"C(c)" is the attic ventilation. They say that because the surface of the attic vents was not large

alleged code violation did not manifest itself until years later.
J-;• :. nits alleged coue vioKiiion ... nvi contemplated by a clause that talks about the
plumbing, electrical and HVAC systems being in sound working condition. One does not speak
of attic ventilation as being in any kind of "working condition." The size of the vents in the attic

]> ! « , * < )

ULI jaeijiuuv

.•'.•:.'• i-.-\ :..ui^ .u uiau ana say mat my attic ventilation is

broken down and not working.
Second, attic ventilation is not part of the HVAC (heating, air-conditioning and

built to supply a home with hot and cool air. The mere placement of vents designed to allow hot
•-Map .\:. - ...;.•: c j . . viiuai a.s pan \)i me i i \ Av system.
Since Plaintiffs have not attempted to squeeze any other of the items on their laundry list
into clause "C(c)", there is nothing more to discuss. Clearly, the court can rule as a matter of law
that Plaintiffs mh-MMvi ,?nw .;'*'<

m^n^n

!

'

\\\<r- Hve^ ris-1 1

CONCLUSION
I'lamiili- n.t\i aii;.^,!- iii.ii tik.iL i> no nupiicu wairam\ of habitability in Utah. I 'hey
admit there are no contract provisions except those found in paragraph "C" upon which to
predicate a claim of breach of contract. Their interpretation of the scope of said paragraph is
wronp as a matter of ! - • P^.ra^mnh "< ' A .--. i = ~ • • • .- ih-I

.= <-- i-.t

• ..:. -i •*.(.. ..^VM-.Np'

by their experts some seven years after they bought the house. Since Dan Smith never received
•J:

<

.si: n ' ^ -

. • . kimg inspector clause "Ma) does

not apply. None of the items on the laundry list constitute a breach of ct C(c)" because the
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electrical, HVAC and plumbing systems have all been in sound working condition since the
house was sold.
Dated this j 3 ^ - f c day of

ty&i

2004.

DIXON, TRUMAN, BANGERTER & FISHER, P.C.

ACKryc
AttorneysTor Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that on the r?_ day Q p ^ y ^ ^ ^ c ^ ^ - , / 2 0 0 4 , 1 mailed a true an correct
copy of the foregoing in the United States mail afSt. George,^5tah, with first class postage
prepaid and addressed as follows:
Gregory B. Hadley
James K. Haslam
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200
Provo,UT 84604
c^

An Employee of Dixon, Truman, Bangerter & Fisher, PC
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ADDENDUM 4

Gregory B.Hadley (3652)
Counsel for Plaintiffs
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 260
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone (801) 377-4403
Facsimile; (801)377-4411
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY
MOORE,
Plaintiffs,

RESPONSE TO COURT'S
DIRECTIVE REGARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS AND
EXPENSES

v.

Civil No. 00700142 MI

DAN SMITH, et al.

Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendants.
Pursuant to this Court's directive regarding Attorney's Fees on June 6, 2005, Plaintiff
does submit this revised billing summary. Plaintiff has followed this Court's directive and has
removed all fees, costs and expenses that could be determined to h^fve no relation to the factual
development and prosecution of Plaintiff s Breach of Contract Claim. Much of the fees are so
closely related and intertwined with the Breach of Contract Claim as to be indistinguishable and
can not now be separated. Attached is Plaintiffs Revised Billing Summary.

DATED this _ 2 _ day June, 2005.

jf

Gregory B. Had ley

l^1
t

I"~/*AXZL.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing on this J_2_
day of June 2005 to the following:
Patrick J. Ascione
Ascione, Heideman & McKay, L.L.C.
2696 University Avenue, Suite #180
P.O. Box 600
Provo, Utah 84603

Gregory B Hadley
Suite 260 Century Park Plaza
2696 North University Avenue
Provo, UT 84604

Invoice submitted to:
Mary Moore
155 West 300 South
Fillmore, UT 84631

March 3 1 , 2005

Professional Services

8/11/2000

JKH

Reviewing and analyzing documentation from client

8/15/2000

JKH

8/16/2000

JKH

Telephone conversation with Tanya Tracy; Legal research
and analysis of claims
Legal research and analysis

8/17/2000

JKH

8/18/2000

JKH

Telephone conversation with Tanya Tracy; legal research
and analysis
Legal research and analysis

JKH

Legal research; telephone conversation with Tanya Tracy

8/23/2000

JKH

8/24/2000

JKH

8/28/2000

JKH

Telephone conversation with Tanya Tracy; planning strategy
with Mr. Hadley; met with client; draft Complaint
Legal research; drafting and revising Complaint; telephone
conversation with Tanya Tracy; telephone conversation with
court clerk; met with client
Reviewing filed Complaint; preparing letter to client,

8/30/200

JKH

Telephone conversation with Tanya Tracey

9/20/2000

JKH

Preparing letter to clients

JKH

Telephone conversation with Mrs. Tracy

10/11/2000

JKH

Telephone call from Mark O'Barr, electrician

10/30/2000

JKH

11/15/2000

JKH

Telephone conversation with Tanya Tracey; Reviewing fax
from client
Reviewing faxed materials; Outlining demand letter

11/27/2000

JKH

Telephone conversation with client

Hrs/Rate

Amounl

0 40
135.00/hr
0.60
135 00/hr
0.20
135.00/hr
0.50
135.00/hr
0.50
135.00/hr
1.00
135.00/hr
1.10
135.00/hr
2.40
135.00/hr

54.00

0 10
135.00/hr
0.20
135.00/hr
0.10
135 00/hr
0.20
135.00/hr
0.10
135.00/hr
0.20
135 00/hr
0.50
135.00/hr
0.20
135.00/hr

81.00
27.00
67 50
67 50
NO CHARGE
148.50
324.00

13 50
27.00
13.50
27 00
13 50
27.00
67 50
27 00

Page

Mary Moore

12/1/2000

JKH

12/12/2000

JKH

Telephone conversation with Shane Moore; Drafting demand
letter to Mr. Smith
Telephone conversation with client

12/14/2000

JKH

Reviewing fax re: service of Smiths

12/20/2000

JKH

Reviewing letter from Mr. Dixon; Telephone conversation with
client

GBH
Draft correspondence to counsel
1/10/2001

GBH

1/16/2001

JKH

1/23/2001

JKH

Telephone call with opposing Attorney

GBH
1/26/2001

JKH

1/29/2001

JKH

1/30/2001

JKH

2/1/2001

GBH

2/6/2001

DH

2/7/2001

GBH

2/8/2001

GBH

2/9/2001

GBH

2/16/2001

JKH

2/28/2001

GBH

2/28/2001

JKH

3/1/2001

JKH
JKH

3/2/2001

JKH

3/5/2001

JKH
JKH

3/6/2001

JKH

3/6/2001

GBH

Reviewing correspondence; Telephone conversation with St.
George law firm; Preparing Proofs of Service for filing with
Court
Telephone conversation with Mr. Dixon; Planning strategy
with Mr. Hadley
Telephone conversation with opposing counsel; Conference
with client; Draft letters
Preparing for conference with opposing counsel; Meeting with
client and friends; Telephone conference with opposing
counsel
Planning strategy with Mr. Hadley
Legal research and analysis
Conference with client
Drafting jury demand
Telephone conversation with Tonya
Telephone conversation with opposing counsel; Draft letter
Conference with client
Reviewing statute; Drafting letter to client
Conference with client; Review Motion
Discussing strategy with Mr. Hadley; Reviewing
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
and Affidavit of Dan Smith
Analysis of Summary Judgment Motion and Affidavit;
Telephone conversation with client; Reviewing Pleading; etc.
Legal research; outlining response to summary judgment
Legal research and analysis; Outlining response to Motion for
Summary Judgment; Telephone message from client
received; outlining facts for affidavit, etc.
Planning strategy with Mr. Hadley
Legal research and analysis; Drafting response to Motion for
Summary'Judgment; Telephone conversation with John
Petersen; Telephone conversation with client, etc.
Drafting Affidavit of Mary Moore and faxing to client;
Preparing statement of material facts; Telephone
conversation with client
Conference with client; Review Affidavit

0.60
135.00/hr
0.30
135.00/hr
0.10
135.00/hr
0.30
135.00/hr
0.10
160.00/hr
0.10
160.00/hr
0.20
135.00/hr
0.20
135.00/hr
0.20
180.00/hr
1.70
135.00/hr
0.40
135.00/hr
0.90
135.00/hr
0.50
180.00/hr
0.30
90.00/hr
0.70
180.00/hr
0.60
180.00/hr
0.70
180.00/hr
0.70
135.00/hr
0.50
180.00/hr
0.40
135.00/hr
1.40
135.00/hr
1.40
135 00/hr
3.00
135.00/hr
0.50
135.00/hr
2.40
135.00/hr

2

81.00
40.50
13.50
40 50
16 00
NO CHARGE
27.00

27.00
36.00
229.50

54.00
121.50
90.00
27.00
126.00
108.00
126.00
94.50
90.00
54.00

189 00
189 00
405.00

67.50
324.00

4.20
135.00/hr

567.00

0.20
180.00/hr

36.00
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Mary Moore

3/7/2001

JKH

3/8/2001

GBH
JKH

Drafting opposing memorandum; Reviewing fax from John
Peterson; Revising opposing memorandum; Telephone
conversation with client; Preparing affidavit for John Peterson
Review draft of Memorandum

3/9/2001

JKH

Drafting and revising Memorandum; Drafting Affidavits for
John Peterson, Jason Bullock and Mark O'Barr; Telephone
conversations with client, Jason Bullock and John Peterson;
Drafting letter to client, Court and opposing counsel
Telephone conversation with client

3/12/2001

JKH

Telephone call from client

3/16/2001

JKH

3/26/2001

JKH

Telephone conversation with Jason Bullock; Revising
Affidavit; Met with Mr. Bullock; Telephone conversation with
client; Preparing letter to Court; Preparing letter and faxing to
opposing counsel
Reviewing Reply Memorandum from opposing counsel

3/27/2001

GBH

Telephone conversation with clerk and client

4/6/2001

GBH

Telephone conversation with client and Court clerk

4/11/2001

GBH

Telephone conversation with client and Court

4/16/2001

GBH

Telephone conversation with Shane

5/15/2001

JKH

Telephone conversation with Shane Moore; Telephone
conversation with Mary; Reviewing Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint; Calendaring
response time
Telephone conversation with Mr. Dixon; Reviewing fax from
Mr. Dixon
Reviewing Opposing and Supplemental Memorandum from
opposing counsel; Legal research and analysis; Planning
strategy
Legal Research and analysis; Outlining and preparing
response

5/18/2001

JKH

5/22/2001

JKH

5/23/2001

JKH

5/24/2001

JKH

5/25/2001

GBH

5/25/2001

JKH

Drafting Objections and Reply Memorandum; Meeting with
Mr. Hadley to discuss strategy; Revising Objection and Reply
Memo; Faxing documents to opposing counsel; Preparing
and reviewing case law to assist Mr. Hadley's preparation for
Court hearing in Fillmore

5/28/2001

GBH

Prepare for Hearing

5/29/2001

JKH

5/31/2001

JKH

6/4/2001

JKH

Planning strategy with Mr. Hadley; Preparing Response to
Smith's Reply Memo; Obtaining case law in preparation for
Court Hearing
Preparing for, travel to, and appearance at Court Hearing in
Fillmore, Discussing strategy with clients; Travel back
Reviewing fax from client

•—9H—

Legal Research and analysis; Drafting Objections and reply
Memorandum in Support of Alternative Motion to Amend
Review Objection and Reply Memorandum

- R e ^ e x r o k n n Mr-Smith licenSe'status

3

2.40
135.00/hr

324.00

0.20
180.00/hr
4.00
135.00/hr

36.00

0.40
135.00/hr
0.10
135.00/hr
0.90
135.00/hr

0.50
135.00/hr
0.30
180.00/hr
0.20
180.00/hr
0.10
180.00/hr
0.30
180.00/hr
0.50
135.00/hr

0.30
135.00/hr
2.00
135.00/hr

540.00

54.00
13.50
121.50

67.50
54.00
36.00
18.00
NO CHARGE
67.50

40 50
270.00

1.00
135.00/hr

135.00

4.90
135.00/hr
0.20
180.00/hr
3.30
135.00/hr

661.50
NO CHARGE
445.50

3.70
180.00/hr
1.70
135.00/hr

NO CHARGE

7.50
135.00/hr

1,012.50

0.10

13.50

135.00/hr
"""
TX2tr
120.00/hr

NO CHARGE

24TB0

Page

Mary Moore

b/7/2001

JKH

Telephone conversation with client, Preliminary preparing
Order
p^r r iisRing Mr Smith'c It^pnqurp with Mr Hunter, P.eviewincL.
hrpn<u*s_with n o p | Telephone call tn Tanya Tracpv
Planning strategy re Order

6/9/2001

GBH

Conference with client

6/11/2001

JKH

Telephone call from Marta at Fourth District Court

GBH

Telephone call with opposing counsel

6/12/2001

GBH

Draft settlement letter

6/13/2001

JKH

6/5/2001
fy^2nn1

JKH

—-J&ldL

Obtaining tapes of hearing, Reviewing tapes to outline and
prepare order
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley, Reviewing tape recorded
for preparation of Order
Listening to tape of hearing and outlining order

6/14/2001

JKH

6/19/2001

JKH

6/20/2001

JKH

6/26/2001

JKH

Preparing Order on Summary Judgment Motions, Reviewing
audio tape
Reviewing portions of hearing, Drafting and revising Order

6/29/2001

GBH

Met with Bryce Dixon

JKH-

Investigating status of Dan Gmitli's'license"

JKH

Jolnphnnn nnnvnrnntmn with riiumnn nf Or.ri ipatinnal ^f\ri
Professional Licensing
Reviewing fax from Mr Dixon

GBH

Telephone conversation with Bryce Dixon and client

7/6/2001

JKH

7/11/2001

JKH

7/12/2001

JKH

Planning strategy with Mr Hadley, Reviewing audio tape of
hearing, Telephone call to Mr Dixon's office
Discussing strategy with Mr Hadley, Reviewing and
analyzing letter from Mr Dixon
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley

7/18/2001

JKH

Making decisions to Order, Drafting letter to Mr Dixon

7/19/2001

JKH

Revising and sending letter to Order to Mr Dixon

7/30/2001

JKH

7/31/2001

JKH

Discussing strategy with Mr Hadley Reviewing letter ftom
Mi Dixon, Outlining response
Discussing strategy with Mr Hadley Planning for response to
Dixon letter

8/1/2001

JKH

7/2/2001
7/5/2001

JKH

Telephone conversation with client
8/2/2001

JKH
Outlining response to Mr Dixon

8/3/2001

JKH
Draft letter to Mr Dixon, Making revisions to proposed Order,

8/9/2001

JKH

8/10/2001

JKH

8/13/2001

JKH

Telephone call to Judge Howard's clerk
Telephone conversation with Mr Dixon, Revising Order,
Faxing Order to Mr Dixon
Telephone conversation with Mr Dixon
Reviewing fax from Mr Dixon, Telephone conversation with
Court, Reviewing letter from Mr Dixon

0 40
135 00/hr
0 40
0 20
135 00/hr
0 50
180 00/hr
0 10
135 00/hr
0 30
180 00/hr
1 00
180 00/hr
0 90
135 00/hi
0 30
135 00/hi
0 40
135 00/hr
0 60
135 00/hr
1 20
135 00/hi
0 50
180 00/hr

——$-30

4

54 00
-54 00
27 00
90 00
13 50
54 00
180 00
121 50
40 50
54 00
81 00
162 00
90 00
40-50—

m-eo/tir
Q-2£_135 00/hr
0 20
135 00/hr
0 20
180 00/hr
0 30
135 00/hr
0 30
135 00/hi
0 20
135 00/hr
1 70
135 00/hi
0 20
135 00/hr

0 30
135 00/hi
0 20
135 00/hi
0 20
135 00/hr
0 60
135 00/hr
1 20
135 00/hr
0 40
135 00/hr
0 10
135 00/hr
0 30
135 00/hi

-^-00

27 00
36 00
40 50
40 50
27 00
229 50
27 00
40 50
27 00
27 00
81 00
162 00
54 00
13 50
40 50

Page

Mary Moore

8/15/2001

JKH

8/16/2001

JKH

9/5/2001

GBH

Telephone conversation with Fillmore Courthouse, Telephone
call to Judge Howard's chambers Preparing letter to Judge
Howard
Delivering Order to Judge Howard, Obtaining Judge's
signature on Order
Telephone conversation with Dixon's office

GBH

Conference with Client

9/7/2001

GBH

Met with Mary

9/8/2001

JKH

Discussing strategy with Mr Hadley

9/9/2001

JKH

9/10/2001

GBH

Legal research re suggestions of death and substitution of
parties, Reviewing discovery requests, Planning strategy with
Mr Hadley
Conference with client

9/12/2001

GBH

Work on expert

9/13/2001

GBH

Locate expert, Call client

9/14/2001

JKH

Preparing responses to discovery requests

9/19/2001

JKH

Preparing discovery responses

9/20/2001

JKH

9/21/2001

JKH

9/25/2001

JKH

Reviewing pleadings and affidavits in preparing discover
responses
Reviewing letters and other documentation in file, Outlining
discovery responses, legal research Telephone conversation
with client Preparing responses

JKH

Draft and revise discovery responses, Reviewing
documentation from client, Conversation with client
Preparing responses to Requests for Admissions

9/26/2001

JKH

Telephone Conversation with Client

10/1/2001

JKH

10/2/2001

JKH

Revising and drafting Responses to Requests for
Admissions, Reviewing photographs and notes from client
Drafting and revising discovery responses

10/3/2001

JKH

i 0/4/2001

GBH
JKH

Final drafting of discovery responses Telephone
conversation with client
Review Response to Admissions

10/5/2001

GBH

Telephone conversation with client, faxing discovery to Mr
Dixon
Telephone conversation with Mr Dixon, preparing Certificate
of Service
Telephone conversation with Expert Lynn Larsen

10/8/2001

GBH

Organize Trial Notebook, Draft letter to Expert

10/15/2001

JKH

Reviewing signed discovery responses from client and note

10/16/2001

JKH

Preparing and mailing new Certificate of Service

JKH

5

0 40
135 00/hr

54 00

0 40
135 00/hi
0 10
180 00/hr
0 30
180 00/hr
8 00
180 00/hi
0 20
135 00/hr
0 90
135 00/hr

54 00

0 40
180 00/hr
1 00
180 00/hr
0 50
180 00/hr
0 40
135 00/hr
0 50
135 00/hr
0 30
135 00/hr
3 40
135 00/hr

2 70
135 00/hr
0 50
135 00/hr
0 10
135 00/hr
0 50
135 00/hr
0 50
135 00/hr
2 90
135 00/hi
0 10
180 00/hr
0 60
135 00/hr
0 40
135 00/hr
0 20
180 00/hr
3 00
180 00/hr
0 10
135 00/hr
0 30
135 00/hi

18 00
NO CHARGE
NO CHARGE
27 00
121 50

72 00
NO CHARGE
90 00
54 00
67 50
40 50
459 00

364 50
67 50
13 50
67 50
67 50
391 50
18 00
81 00
54 00
36 00
540 00
13 50
40 50

Page

Mary Moore

11/8/2001

JKH

11/9/2001

GBH

Planning strategy with Mr Hadley, Legal Research and
analysis, Preparing Motion for Substitution and Memorandum
in Support Telephone conversation with client
Conference with client

11/13/2001

GBH

Telephone conversation with Expert

11/20/2001

GBH

Draft letter

11/27/2001

GBH

Draft Notice and Order

11/28/2001

JKH

Telephone conversation with client

12/24/2001

GBH

Conference with client

12/31/2001

JKH

Review expert's report on building code violations

1/18/2002

JKH

Review and analyze Expert Report, Legal research and

I/22/2002

JKH

1/23/2002

JKH

1/28/2002

JKH
GBH

analysis, Telephone call to Project Analyst, Planning strategy
Telephone conversation with Sande @ Project Analysts,
Review prior correspondence with Dixon, Telephone
conversation with client, Outlining and Drafting letter to Dixon
Prepare letter to Mr Dixon, Telephone conversation with Mr
Dixon, Legal research and analysis
Prepare strategy with Mr Hadley, Telephone conference with
client, etc
Analyze strategy, Consult with client

I/29/2002

GBH

Conference with client

1/30/2002

JKH

1/31/2002

JKH

2/1/2001

JKH

2/4/2002

JKH

Prepare stipulated discovery plan, Motion, Order, Legal
research
Revise stipulated discovery plan, Motion and Scheduling
Order, Prepare cover letter for Mr Dixon
Discuss strategy, Telephone call to Project Analysts,
Planning strategy, Outline discovery requests
Prepare discovery requests and initial disclosures

2/5/2002

JKH

Revise schedule order and fax to Mr Dixon

2/8/2002

JKH

Prepare letter to Mr Dixon

2/11/2002

JKH

Review letter from Mr Dixon's office

2/19/2002

JKH

Telephone call to Mr Dixon and Mr Fisher, Prepare and fax
letter to opposing counsel
Prepare discovery requests

JKH
2/21/2002

JKH

2/22/2002

JKH

2/26/2002

JKH

Telephone conversation with Nathan Fisher, Telephone
conversation with client
Review proposed scheduling order from opposing counsel

2/27/2002

GBH

Telephone conversation with client, Plan strategy with Mr
Hadley
Various calls to Court and Bryce Dixon, Review Scheduling
Orders, Draft letter to counsel
Call Bryce, Call court, Draft letter

3/1/2002

GBH

Telephone conversation with Bryce, court and Mary

GBH

6

1 90
135 00/hr

256 50

0 10
180 00/hr
0 10
180 00/hr
0 10
180 00/hr
0 30
180 00/hr
0 20
135 00/hr
0 40
180 00/hr
0 20
135 00/hr
1 50
135 00/hi
2 00
135 00/hi

18 00

1 30
135 00/hr
1 20
135 00/hr
1 20
180 00/hi
0 10
180 00/hr
0 90
135 00/hr
0 40
135 00/hr
1 50
135 00/hr
0 60
135 00/hr
0 20
135 00/hi
0 40
135 00/hr
0 10
135 00/hr
0 40
135 00/hr
1 00
135 00/hr
0 40
135 00/hr
0 10
135 00/hr
0 80
135 00/hr
1 10
180 00/hr
0 30
180 00/hr
0 40
180 00/hr

18 00
18 00
54 00
27 00
72 00
27 00
202 50
270 00

175 50
NO CHARGE
216 00
18 00
121 50
54 00
202 50
81 00
27 00
54 00
13 50
54 00
135 00
54 00
13 50
108 00
198 00
54 00
72 00

Page

Mary Moore

3/1/2002

JKH

3/4/2002

JKH

Legal research; Review documents; Draft Motion for
scheduling conference and order and the supporting memo
Revise and draft motion and memo re: scheduling order

3/5/2002

JKH

Review fax from Mr. Fisher

3/7/2002

JKH

Telephone conversation with Mr. Fishers office

3/22/2002

GBH

Meeting with Expert

3/25/2002

JKH

Review proposed interrogatories and requests from experts;

3/26/2002

JKH

3/28/2002

JKH

4/3/2002

JKH

Prepare further interrogatories
Review and revise stipulated discovery plan, motion and
order; Preparing letter to opposing counsel
Meeting with law clerk re: discovery, Phone conversation with
Nathan Fisher
Telephone conversation with law clerk re: discovery

4/8/2002

JKH

Prepare formal discovery requests

4/9/2002

JKH

Prepare formal discovery requests; Review int. disc, rule

4/12/2002

JKH

Telephone conversation with opposing counsel office

4/15/2002

JKH

Review letter from opposing counsel; Telephone

4/17/2002

JKH

conversation with opposing counsel; Prepare initial
disclosures
Prepare letter to Court; Legal research; Finalize disclosures

4/18/2002

JKH

Telephone conversation with client; Finalize discovery

4/25/2002

JKH

Review faxed initial disclosures from opposing counsel

4/29/2002

JKH

Review; Planning strategy with Mr. Hadley

5/22/2002

JKH

Review 2nd set of interrogatories from Smiths

5/24/2002

JKH

Prepare responses to discovery; legal research on expert

5/29/2002

JKH

Prepare outlining expert reports

5/31/2002

RC

Read and outline research

6/4/2002

RC

Research and writing

RC

Research and writing

JKH

Prepare planning strategy with Mr. Hadley

6/5/2002

JKH

Outline information needed in expert reports

6/6/2002

RC

Research

6/7/2002

RC

Prepare proof chart

6/10/2002

GBH

Meeting with Mr. Haslam and law clerk

JKH

Meeting with Mr. Hadley and law clerk

1.20
135.00/hr
0.20
135.00/hr
0.10
135.00/hr
0.10
135.00/hr
0.10
180.00/hr
0.40
135.00/hr
0.40
135.00/hr
0.40
135.00/hr
0.10
135.00/hr
1.50
135.00/hr
0.40
135.00/hr
0.10
135.00/hr
0.70
135.00/hr
0.80
135.00/hr
1.30
135.00/hr
0.20
135.00/hr
0.20
135.00/hr
0.20
150.00/hr
1.00
150.00/hr
0.40
150.00/hr
0.20
60.00/hr
2.50
60.00/hr
.1.50
60.00/hr
0.40
150.00/hr
0.50
150.00/hr
0.60
60.00/hr
0.60
60.00/hr
0.70
180.00/hr
0.70
150.00/hr

7

162.00
27 00
13.50
13.50
18 00
54.00
54.00
54.00
13.50
202.50
54.00
13.50
94.50

108.00
175.50
27.00
27.00
30.00
150.00
60.00
12.00
150.00
90.00
60.00
75.00
36.00
36.00
126.00
NO CHARGE

Page
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RC

Meeting with Mr Hadley and Mr Haslam

RC

Prepare proof chart and meeting

JKH

Legal research re amendment of complaint

6/11/2002

RC

Research

6/12/2002

JKH

6/13/2002

JKH

Prepare expert reports, subpoena to City of Fillmore
Planning strategy
Telephone conversation with Mark O'Barr

6/14/2002

JKH

6/17/2002

JKH

6/19/2002

JKH

6/10/2002

JKH

Telephone conversation with Nathan Fisher, Phone
conversation with Jason Bullock, Prepare letter to O'Barr
Prepare letter to Mr Fisher, Telephone conversation with Mr
Bullock, Prepare reports, Outline defects for discovery
Review new discovery requests from Smiths, Prepare letter
to Sheriff, Phone conversation with client
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley and law clerk

6/20/2002

GBH

Draft letter, Consultation with client, Retain appraiser

6/24/2002

JKH

6/25/2002

JKH

Telephone conversation with client, Review discovery
requests and outline responses
Prepare expert reports, Legal research

6/26/2002

JKH

6/27/2002

JKH

Telephone conversation with Mr Hatch, Planning strategy
with Mr Hadley, Prepare discovery responses Legal
research re Motion to Amend (cause of action)
Telephone conversation with Mr Steenblik, Finalize expert
report for Radford and Steenblik, Prepare letter to Mr Fisher

For professional services rendered

0 70
60 00/hr
1 50
60 00/hr
0 20
150 00/hr
0 30
60 00/hr
1 30
150 00/hr
0 30
150 00/hr
1 00
150 00/hr
1 10
150 00/hr
0 80
150 00/hr
0 40
150 00/hr
0 80
180 00/hi
0 40
150 00/hr
0 40
150 00/hr
0 70
150 00/hr

HO CHARGE

1 70
150 00/hr

255 00

GBH

Filing Fee

12/13/2000

GBH

Service of Summons and Complaint to Mr & Mrs Smith

2/6/2001

GBH

Long Distance

2/9/2001

GBH

Jury Demand

3/8/2001

GBH

Long Distance

4/9/2001

GBH

Long Distance

b/4/2001

GBH

Ordei tapes

6/7/2001

GBH

Long Distance

7/11/2001

GBH

Long Distance

8/16/2001

JKH

Copy Costs

9/6/2001

GBH

Copy Costs

90 00
30 00
18 00
195 00
45 00
150 00
165 00
120 00
60 00
144 00
60 00
60 00
105 00

190 50

$22,373 50

-

Additional Charges
8/24/2000

8

i*s- $0

TokCTlSL,!
Qty/Price
1
120 00
1
31 00
1
1 95
1
50 00
1
13 36
1
5 60
1
16 00
1
3.22
1
4.03
1
3 45
15
0 15

120 00
31 00
1 95
50 00
13 36
5 60
16 00
3 22
4 03
3 45
2 25

Page

Mary Moore

9/10/2001

GBH

Long Distance

9/12/2001

GBH

Copy Costs

9/21/2001

GBH

Copy Costs

10/4/2001

GBH

Postage

GBH

Copy Costs

10/8/2001

GBH

Copy Costs

10/11/2001

GBH

Long Distance

10/16/2001

GBH

Copy Costs

10/26/2001

GBH

Copy Costs

10/29/2001

GBH

FedEx

11/14/2001

GBH

Long Distance

11/20/2001

GBH

Copy Costs

11/28/2001

GBH

Copy Costs

12/10/2001

GBH

Long Distance

1/14/2002

GBH

Long Distance

1/28/2002

JKH

Copy Costs

2/11/2002

GBH

Long Distance

3/15/2002

GBH

Long Distance

3/19/2002

GBH

Fiat fee for analysis of discovery fee

3/20/2002

GBH

3/25/2002

GBH

3/28/2002

GBH

4/17/2002

GBH

Copy Costs

4/30/2002

JKH

Long Distance

5/6/2002

GBH

Long Distance

5/9/2002

JKH

Long Distance

5/31/2002

GBH

Copy Costs

6/19/2002

GBH

Subpoena Fee

6/27/2002

JKH

Copy Costs

Total Costs

1
1.21
1
0.60
2
0.15
1
2.57
31
0.15
18
0.15
1
10.56
15
0.15
3
0.15
1
16.12
1
5.36
2
0.15
8
0.15
1
3.25
1
2.76
57
0.15
1
3.94
1
3.75
1
115.00
0.5
60.00
0.5
60.00
2.5
60.00
10
0.15
1
.2.50
1
26.67
1
2.10
60
0.15
1
7.00
80
0.15

9

1.21
0 60
0.30
2.57
4.65
2.70
10.56
2.25
0.45
16.12
5.36
0.30
1.20
3.25
2 76
8.55
3 94
3.75
115.00
30.00
30.00
150.00
1.50
2.50
26.67
2.10
9.00
7.00
12.00
$1,184.52

Gregory B Hadley
Suite 260 Century Park Plaza
2696 North University Avenue
Provo, UT 84604

Invoice submitted to
Mary Moore
155 West 300 South
Fillmore UT 84631

June 17,2005

Professional Services
Hrs/Rate

7/3/2002 J

Telephone conversation with with Marlen Stevens, Searching for
alternate appraisers, etc
Telephone conversation with client

7/8/2002 J

Telephone conversation with Steve Hatch

7/2/2002 J

J

Preparing discovery responses and motion to amend

7/9/2002 J

Telephone conversation with city employees re subpeona,
Telephone conversation with Sheriffs office, Reviewing fax from
Millard County Sheriff, etc
7/12/2002 GBH Reviewing subpoened documents from City of Fillmore
J
7/16/2002 J

Reviewing subpoened documents from City of Fillmore

RC

Analyzing documentation from city, Planning strategy, Telephone
conversation with client
Proof Chart, Research, etc

GBH

Talk with appraiser

7/19/2002 J

Legal research, Preparing motion to amend

7/29/2002 J

Draft Motion to Amend and Memorandum

7/31/2002 J

Telephone conversation with Nathan Fisher

8/1/2002 J
8/13/2002 J

Preparing letter to opposing council and amended complaint
Telephone conversation with Mr Fisher

0
150
0
150
0
150
0
150
1
150

60
00/hr
40
00/hr
30
00/hr
50
00/hr
00
00/hr

0
180
0
150
0
150
2
50
0
180
0
150
0
150
0
150
0
150
0
150

30
00/hr
30
00/hr
80
00/hr
00
00/hr
10
00/hr
80
00/hr
60
00/hr
20
00/hr
80
00/hr
10
00/hr

_

Amount
90 00
60 00
45 00
75 00
150 00

54 00
45 00
120 00
100 Ou
18 00
120 00
90 00
30 00
120 00
15 00

Mary Moore
Hrs/Rate

9/10/2002 GBH

Telephone conversation with Mr Fisher and Mr Dixon, reviewing
letters from opposing counsel
Preparing Notice of Deposition, drafting letter to opposing counsel
drafting letter to client
Legal research, finalizing Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and
Memorandum, Revising letter to opposing counsel
Legal research, review documents, preparing response to Third Set
of Dis
Draft letter to Mary, review answers

9/11/2002 J

Preparing expert report for Hatch, telephone call to Mr Hatch

9/16/2002 J

Reviewing opposing memorandum, Discussing strategy with Mr
Hadley, telephone converation with Mr Hatch
Legal research and copies at BYU law school, review and anaylize
opposing memo, Review correspondence, prior court date, and other
documents, Draft and revise Reply Memo,
.
. .

8/19/2002 J
8/20/2002 J
8/21/2002 J
9/5/2002 J

9/19/2002 J

UcvK K0f treslaxw to

9/20/2002 LC
9/23/2002 GBH

Consultation with Mary

9/24/2002 J

Reviewing lettei from Mr Fisher

9/26/2002 J

Meeting with Mr Hadley to discuss strategy

9/27/2002 J

Preparing Notice to Submit, preparing letter and copies to Mr Fisher

10/2/2002 GBH
GBH
10/3/2002 J
GBH
10/9/2002 J
10/10/2002 J
10/29/2002 GBH
J

Talk with Bryce Dixon (Smith)
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley
Consultation with Mary
Preparing letter to Mr Fisher
Legal research, Revising letter to opposing counsel, Sending
documents to opposing counsel
Consultation with client and review motions
Reviewing Motion and Strategy with Greg

10/30/2002 GBH Telephone court clerk, Draft Notice to Submit and Motion for
Enlargement
11/7/2002 GBH Telephone conversation with court clerk, draft Order, Review Motion
Talk with Defendant's counsel
11/8/2002 GBH Talk with Bryce Dixon
11/11/2002 GBH

Draft Memonalization of Agreement and letter

1 1/12/2002 GBH Draft and Finalize Motion for Summary Judgment

Amount

0
150
0
150
1
150
1
150
0
180
0
150
0
150
4
150

60
00/hr
90
00/hr
10
00/hr
20
00/hr
10
00/hr
50
00/hr
60
00/hr
20
00/hr

0
90
0
180
0
150
0
150
0
150
0
180
0
180
0
150
0
180
0
150
0
150
0
180
0
150
0
180
1
180
0
180
0
180
0
180

50
4-5-et)
00/hr
10
NO CHARGb
00/hr
10
15 00
00/hr
10
15 00
00/hr
50
75 00
00/hr
30
5^60
00/hr
20
36 00
00/hi
20
30 00
00/hr
30
54 00
00/hr
40
60 00
00/hr
40
60 00
00/hr
80
^44 00
00/hr
50
NO CHARGE
00/hr
70
NO CHARGE
00/hr
40
252 00
00/hr
10
18 00
00/hr
30
54 00
00/hr
50
90 00
00/hi

90 00
135 00
165 00
180 00
18 00
75 00
90 00
630 00

Mary Moore
Hrs/Rate
11/14/2002 G0H

Meeting with Court Clerk and Experts

11/18/2002 GBH Talk with Nathan, Review Code, Draft lettert o Jason Bullock
11/20/2002 GBH

Draft Expert Qualifications letter and Objection to hearing

11/21/2002 GBH Talk with Bryce and Consultation with Mary
GBH
11/22/2002 GBH
J
11/23/2002 GBH
11/25/2002 GBH
J

Reviewing letter from Bryce and draft response, review letter from
Nathan
Reviewing and organizing file
Telephone conference with Mr Hadley
Draft trial preparation outline and go to Law Library
Talk with Mary, Jim and Nathan Fisher
Reviewing file, discuss strategy with Mr Hadley, telephone

11/26/2002 GBH

conference with client, leqal research

11/27/2002 GBH

Meeting with Jim, Consulation with Client and TalK with Aaron

J

Talk with court, Draft Notice

11/28/2002 GBH

Legal research and analysis, planning strategy with Mr Hadley

11/29/2002 GBH

Preparing file

J
11/30/2002 GBH
GBH

Reviewing discovery, work on file
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley
Reviewing discovery and documents

Reviewing Plaintiffs discovery and draft objections and answers and
letter
12/3/2002 GBH Consultation with client, finalize answers and objections to Discovery
Call Court clerk, draft request, review notes and consultation with
12/4/2002 GBH client
Planning strategy for hearing, call Marty
J
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley
12/2/2002 GBH

12/6/2002 J
1/2/2003 GBH

Prepare Verified Correction to Affidavit and Memorandum
Reviewing documents & Letters from Mary

GBH
Talk with Mary and Court Clerk
1/3/2003 J
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley

Amount

144 00
0 80
180 00/hr
0 20
36 00
180 00/hr
1 00
180 00
180 00/hr
1 40
252 00
180 00/hr
0 30
54 00
180 00/hr
5 00
NO CHARGE
180 00/hr
0 10
15 00
150 00/hr
3 40
NO CHARGE
180 00/hr
1 50
270 00
180 00/hr
1 40
210 00
150 00/hr
1 00
180 00
180 00/hr
0 30
54 00
180 00/hr
2 00
300 00
150 00/hr
1 50
NO CHARGE
180 00/hr
3 00
NO CHARGE
180 00/hr
0 20
30 00
150 00/hr
1 40
NO CHARGE
180 00/hr
1 00
180 00
180 00/hr
2 30
414 00
180 00/hr
1 70
306 00
180 00/hr
0 40
72 00
180 00/hr
0 50
75 00
150 00/hr
0 50
75 00
150 00/hr
0 50
90 00
180 00/hr
0 30
NO CHARGE
180 00/hr
0 40
NO CHARGE
150 00/hr

Page

Maiy Moore
Hrs/Rate
Reviewing prior correspondence and pleadings, Legal research at
BYU, drafting Opposing Memo to Motion to Compel/for sanctions
1/9/2003 GBH Attend Telephonic Oral Argument, Consultation with Client, Call
Court Clerk, Draft notices & Letters, Talk with Mary and Nathan
Fisher various times, Review Rules
Preparing for telephone hearing, met with Mr Hadley, telephone
J
hearing
1/10/2003 GBH various calls and consultation with client, Call Rex and talk with Mary
1/8/2003 J

J

Legal research at law library, drafting and revising opposing memo

1/13/2003 GBH Talk with Rex Radford (twice), call Lloyd and Mary, Talk with Nathan
Fisher, Draft letter
1/14/2003 GBH Talk with Stephen Hatch and Rex Radford, Talk with Nathan
1/15/2003 GBH Talk with Rex Radford, Court, Mary and Nathan
GBH
1/16/2003 J
1/17/2003 GBH
1/20/2003 GBH

Conference call with Court and Nathan, Call witnesses, consultation
with Mary, work on Order
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley
Review notes, draft Am Sch Order and Cover letter to Nathan
Fisher Work on Designation
Review prior designation and Draft designations of experts

Legal research at BYU Law Library, Preparing response to motion
for sanctions or to compel
1/27/2003 GBH Finalize Memo
1/23/2003 J

1/28/2003 GBH

Reviewing Nathan's letter, call Jack Peterson, Consultation with client

1/29/2003 GBH Talk with Nathan Fisher, Consultation with Mary, Call Project Analysts
1/31/2003 GBH Talk with Nathan Fisher, Jason & Mark-Draft Letter
2/3/2003 GBH Talk with Mary
2/4/2003 GBH Telephone calls to Nathan Fisher, Meet with clerk
2/5/2003 GBH

Review Briefs and prepare for Oral Arguments

2/6/2003 GBH

Prepare Expert outline, Go to Fillmore, Argue Case, Travel Home

GBH

Meet with Experts and Mary's house

2/10/2003 GBH Talk with Mary, Call Terry Kemp, organize letter to Mary and Draft do
list organization, call Jason, outline preparedness schedule with Terry
Meeting with Mr Hadley to gather facts
TK
2/11/2003 TK

Legal research

TK

Legal research

4
150
4
180

10
00/hr
00
00/hr

4

Amount
615 00
720 00

1 30
NO CHARGL
150 00/hr
1 30
234 00
180 00/hr
2 10
31500
150 00/hr
1 80
324 00
180 00/hr
1 00
180 00
180 00/hr
1 20
216 00
180 00/hr
2 00
360 00
180 00/hr
0 20
30 00
150 00/hr
1 20
216 00
180 00/hr
1 50
270 00
180 00/hr
2 10
315 00
150 00/hr
0 50
90 00
180 00/hr
1 00
180 00
180 00/hf
1 00
180 00
180 00/hr
0 50
90 00
180 00/hr
0 10
18 00
180 00/hr
1 00
180 00
180 00/hr
11 10
1 998 00
180 00/hr
7 50
1 350 00
180 00/hr
1 00
180 00
180 00/hr
3 50
630 00
180 00/hr
1 90
142 50
75 00/hr
1 10
82 50
75 00/hr
0 80
60 00
75 00/hr

Page

Mary Moore
Hrs/Rate
2/11/2003 TK

Legal research

TK

Legal research

2/12/2003 TK

Draft Questions and Comments

TK

Legal research

TK

Finish Draftings

TK

Reviewing Pleadings

2/13/2003 TK

Meeting with Mr Hadley on Fact gathering

TK

Legal research at BYU Law Library

TK

Talk with Mr Hadley on Issues

TK

Reviewing contract

TK

Reviewing and write UCA provision

TK

Draft Memos

TK

Telephone conversation with Holman

TK

Draft Memos

TK

Drafting Memos from 6 55 to 8 10

TK

Finish Drafting Memos

GBH

Draft Orders, Objections, letter to Nathan, Consultation with client
and experts, Draft Answers to Discovery
Finalize, Type & Deliver Memos

2/14/2003 TK
GBH

Travel to and From Fillmore

GBH
2/15/2003 LC

Meeting with Experts. Go to Courthouse & City Offices, Draft
objections, finish answers
Legal research for Proof Sheet

2/17/2003 TK

Logal research,- Draft Maack Caco—

TK

Meeting with Mr Hadley
""Legal leseBmh-aftd-Brdfl Maack Cdse~

TK

Legal research and draft Schafir case

TK

Draft Memo Questions and Ideas

0 90
75 00/hr
0 75
75 00/hr
0 25
75 00/hr
0 25
75 00/hr
1 50
75 00/hr
1 60
75 00/hr
0 30
75 00/hr
0 75
75 00/hr
0 79
75 00/hr
0 25
75 00/hr
0 60
75 00/hr
1 20
75 00/hr
0 75
75 00/hr
1 25
75 00/hr
1 25
75 00/hr
0 75
75 00/hr
7 50
180 00/hr
0 75
75 00/hr
3 20
180 00/hr
5 00
180 00/hr
4 00
60 00/hr
1 80
75 00/hr
0 20
75 00/hr
1-50
75 00/hr
1 30
75 00/hr
0 25
75 00/hr

Amount
67 50
56 25
18 75
18 7S
112 t>u
120 00
22 50
56 25
58 88
18 75
45 00
90 00
56 25
93 75
93 75
50 25
1,350 00
56 25
576 00
900 00
240 00
1>3£-Q0
15 00
442-&0-97 50
18 75

Page

Mary Moore
Hrs/Rate
2/17/2003 TK
GBH
2/18/2003 TK
GBH
2/19/2003 GBH

2/20/2003 GBH
2/21/2003 GBH

Finalize Type and Attempt Delivery
Prepare for Depositions
Meeting with Mr Hadley
Travel to Salt Lake, Attend Lloyd's Deposition, Travel to Fillmore
Meeting with Mary and Friend
Talk with Experts, organize Depo questions, Consultation with Mary
Attend Mark O'Barr's Depo, Attend Mary's Depo, Meet with Jason

Bullock
Prepare for Jack and Jason's Depositions, Attend Depos,
Consultation with Mary
Prepare for and take Dan and Carol's Deposition, Travel to Provo

2/26/2003 GBH Talk with Bryce
3/5/2003 LC

Legal research

3/6/2003 LC

Legal research

LC

Legal research

GBH

Consultation with Mary, call Experts

GBH

Talk with Jason

3/7/2003 LC

Legal research

3/11/2003 GBH

Review letters, talk with Bryce, Rex and Jason

3/12/2003 LC

Draft Memo

LC

Draft Memo

3/14/2003 GBH
3/17/2003 GBH

Review Defendant's various correspondence, clerk's brief, draft letter
to counsel, consultation with Mary, call Mark O'Barr, Jason and Rex
Review Mary's Depo, attend depos of Mary and Rex

3/18/2003 GBH

Consultation with Mary, review Jason questions

3/19/2003 GBH Talk with all experts, talk with Mary
GBH

Prepare for Barrett Depo

3/20/2003 GBH

Final preparation and attend deposition

3/31/2003 GBH

Consultation with client, talk with experts

4/1/2003 GBH Talk with Clerk and Robert Stanley
4/4/2003 GBH

Review Deposition and Consultation with Mary

1
75
2
180
0
75
11
180
8
180

25
00/hr
00
00/hr
20
00/hr
80
00/hr
50
00/hr

13 10
180 00/hr
11 00
180 00/hr
0 10
180 00/hr
0 70
60 00/hr
0 20
60 00/hr
1 30
60 00/hr
1 10
180 00/hr
0 20
180 00/hr
0 70
60 00/hr
0 60
180 00/hr
1 00
60 00/hi
1 50
60 00/hr
1 60
180 00/hr
11 50
180 00/hr
0 50
180 00/hr
1 00
180 00/hr
7 20
180 00/hr
7 20
180 00/hr
1 10
180 00/hr
0 20
180 00/hr
3 30
180 00/hr

_

G

Amoun
93 7C
360 01
15 0C
2,124 OC
1 530 0C

2,358 0C
1.980 0C
18 0C
42 0C
12 0C
78 0C
198 OC
36 0C
42 0C
108 0C
60 0C
90 0C
288 0C
2,070 0C
90 0C
180 0C
1 296 0C
1.296 0C
198 0C
36 0C
594 Ou

Page

Mary Moore
Hrs/Rate
4/9/2003 GBH
4/22/2003 GBH

Review Code on signing of depo, talk with Mary
Meeting with Jason Bullock

4/28/2003 GBH Talk with Lloyd
5/8/2003 GBH Consultation with Mary
5/14/2003 GBH

Call Experts and Review Moore Deposition

5/15/2003 GBH

Meeting with Clerk, Talk with Mary

5/30/2003 GBH Talk with Project Analysts
6/4/2003 GBH

Reviewing memos; Draft response; Talk with Court Clerk

6/10/2003 GBH

Reviewing memo

6/11/2003 GBH

Preparing Points and Authorities.

6/12/2003 GBH Talk with Jason
6/13/2003 GBH

Consultation with Mary; Draft letter to Judge; Review Dixon letter;
Work a brief for expert fees.
LC
Drafting Expert Witness Fees; Meeting with Greg; Drafting Motion
and Memo.
6/14/2003 GBH Preparing Briefs
LC

Drafting a memo; Meet with Greg.

6/16/2003 GBH Talk with Jason - Mark; Consultation with Marty- Finalize Motion and
Memo; Memo on S.J. Motion
Redraft Moore S.J.; Copy and Mail.
LC
6/18/2003 GBH

Reviewing Bill from Mike and Law Clerk

6/20/2003 GBH

Reviewing bill; Call Mary; Draft tender onto court; Draft letter to Mike
Barrett.
6/23/2003 GBH Talk with Court clerk and Mary.
6/24/2003 GBH

Reviewing Brief; Reply to Memo; Draft Notice.

6/26/2003 GBH Talk with Court Clerk.
7/2/2003 LC

Draft Objection to Reply

7/3/2003 GBH Work on Memo on Excessive paged Brief
LC
7/8/2003 LC

Legal research
Draft Reply

/

Amount

0.50
90.00
180.00/hr
54 00
0.30
180.00/hr
54 00
0.30
180.00/hr
0.20
36 00
180.00/hr
1.00
180 00
180.00/hr
0.50
90.00
180.00/hr
0.10
18.00
180.00/hr
1.20
216.00
180.00/hr
2.40
432.00
180.00/hr
4.50
810.00
180.00/hr
0.10
18 00
180.00/hr
1.00
180.00
180.00/hr
6.00
360.00
60.00/hr
4.00
720.00
180.00/hr
8.50
510.00
60.00/hr
16.00
2,880.00
180.00/hr
17.00
1,020.00
60.00/hr
0.10
18.00
180.00/hr
0.40
72.00
180.00/hr
0.70
126.00
180.00/hr
0.60
108 00
180.00/hr
0.10
18 00
180.00/hr
2.50
150.00
60.00/hr
1.00
180.00
180.00/hr •
2.00
120 00
60.00/hr
5.00
INO CHARGE
60.00/hr
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Mary Moore

3/1/2003 GBH

Photocopies

3/3/2003 GBH

Photocopies

3/5/2003 GBH

Fees for Rick Tatton- Court Reporter

GBH
3/6/2003 GBH

Hotel for Deposition

3/10/2003 GBH

Postage for Smith's Expert Witness Report mailed to Sunrise
Engineering, Project Analysts and Mary
Long Distance Charges

3/17/2003 GBH

Develop Film

3/20/2003 GBH

Mike Barrett Fee

3/31/2003 GBH

Fees for Project Analyst

GBH

Fees for Robert Stanley- Court Reporter

4/1/2003 GBH

Postage

4/9/2003 GBH

Long Distance Charges

4/22/2003 GBH

Reporter fee for Copies of Mary Moore and Rex Radford Deposition

4/30/2003 GBH

Photocopies

5/7/2003 GBH

4 Copies of Michael Barrett's Expert Report for Deposition

5/8/2003 GBH

Reporter fee for Deposition of Mike Barrett

5/9/2003 GBH

Long Distance Charges

5/15/2003 GBH

Project Analyst Bill (Lloyd Steenblik)

6/16/2003 GBH

Expert Fee - Jason Bullock

GBH

Expert Fee - Mark O'Barr

GBH

Expert Fee - Tender into Court

8/1/2003 GBH

Photocopies

8/12/2003 GBH

Long Distance Charges for July

10/1/2003 GBH

Photocopies

10/2/2003 GBH

Postage

10/16/2003 GBH

Long Distance Charges

17

Qty/Pnce

Amount

83
0 15
99
0 15
1
571 00
1
137 04
1
3 87
1
33 04
1
56 52
1
600 00
1
4,577 79
1
1,308 30
1
1 06
1
20 14
1
403 20
15
0 15
1
107 58
1
420 00
1
11 98
1
170 40
1
1,997 50
1
1,020 00
1
1,375 00
11
0 15
1
2 99
24
0 15
1
2 26
1
1551

12 45
14 85
571 00
137 04
3 87
33 04
56 52
600 00
4,577 79
1,308 30
1 Ou
20 14
403 20
2 20
107 5.c
420 0C
11 98
170 40
1,997 50
1,020 00
1,375 00
1 65
2 99
3 60
2 20
15 51

Mary Moore

Page

10/20/2003 GBH

FedEx fees for mailing of deposition to Project Analysts

18

Qtv/Pnce

Amouni

1

37 32

37 32
10/29/2003 GBH

Postage

1

1 6C

1 66
10/31/2003 GBH

Photocopies

55

8 25

0 15
11/7/2003 GBH

Long Distance Charges

1

9 44

9 44
GBH

Expert Witness- Lloyd Steenblik Invoice of Nov 6, 2003

1

298 60

298 60
12/1/2003 GBH

Photocopies

11

1 65

0 15
12/5/2003 GBH

Postage

1

1 52

1 52
12/11/2003 GBH

Long Distance Charges

1

7 08

7 08
1/28/2004 GBH

Long Distance Charges

1

4 93

4 93
1/31/2004 GBH

Photocopies December 2003

39

5 85

0 15
GBH

Photocopies January 2004

2

0 30

0 15
2/2/2004 GBH

Interest @ 18% APR

1

32 12

32 12
2/9/2004 GBH

Prior Time and Balance Carried Forward from 2003

1

5 548 30

5,548 30
3/30/2004 GBH

Long Distance Charges

1

32"

3 21
3/31/2004 GBH

Photocopies

68

10 2C

0 15
GBH

Postage

1

1 20

1 20
4/29/2004 GBH

Long Distance Charges

1

1 70

1 70
5/6/2004 GBH

Postage

1

1 89

1 89
5/26/2004 GBH

Postage

1

1 20

1 20
5/27/2004 GBH

Long Distance Charges

1

8 70

8 70
5/28/2004 GBH

Photocopies

6/30/2004 GBH

Long Distance Charges for June

55
015
1

8 25
2 27

2 27
7/8/2004 GBH

Witness Fee (for Jack Peterson)

1

18 50

18 50
GBH

Postage

1

I 57

1 57
7/9/2004 GBH

Postage

1

37 23

37 23
GBH

Postage

1
3 37

33/

Page

Mary Moore

Qty/Price
7/12/2004 GBH

Photocopies (Appeal)

7/13/2004 GBH

Filing Fee (Appeal)

GBH

UPS charge for Overnight to Dixon (Appeal)

GBH

Postage

7/27/2004 GBH

Long Distance Charges

7/30/2004 GBH

Photocopies

9/1/2004 GBH
2/18/2005 GBH

Long Distance Charges
Witness Fees

GBH

Postage

2/28/2005 GBH

Postage

GBH

Photocopies

GBH

Long Distance Charges

3/3/2005 GBH

Postage

3/4/2005 GBH

Duplicate copies of pictures to use as Exhibits at Trial

3/7/2005 GBH

Postage

3/10/2005 GBH

GBH

Hotel for Trial
Expert Fees for Project Analyst Paid Directly by Mary 10/20/00$65 00, 11/12/01- $2,500 00, 2/10/02- $3,287 49

GBH
Expert Fee for Project Analysts Trial Attendance and Prep

GBH
Expert Fees for Sunrise Engineering Paid Directly by Mary 8/9/00

GBH
GBH
GBH

Rex Radford Expert Fees (9 00 hours 2/6/03, 6 25 hours 3/14/03,
4 50 hours 3/17/03, 1 00 hour 3/20/03)
Expert Fee for Jason Bullock -Depo time 3/20/03 Never Paid by
Smiths
Expert Fee for Jason Bullock Trial Attendance and Prep

3/11/2005 GBH
Abstract Fee
3/18/2005 GBH
Recorder fee
4/1/2005 GBH
Photocopies
GBH
Postage

1
16 50
1
205 00
1
19 35
1
1 71
1
32 62
216
0 15
1
7 99
1
74 00
1
2 77
1
2 12
141
0 15
1
2 35
1
3 04
1
21 04
1

1 98
1
282 76
1
5,852 49
1
2,142 35
1
78 00
1
2,593 75
1
382 50
1
850 00
1
40 00
1
14 00
598
0 15
1
3 96

19

Amounl
16 50
205 00
19 35
1 7i
32 62
32 40
7 99
74 00
2 77
2 12
21 15
2 3b
3 04
21 01
1 9o
282 7*.
5,852 49
2 142 JC
78 00
2 59J /I
382 50
850 00
40 00
14 00
89 7U
3 96

Mary Moore

Page

4/14/2005 GBH

Photocopies

zb

Qty/Pnce

Amoun,

16

2 40

0 15
GBH

Long Distance Charges

1

341

3 41
GBH

Long Distance Charges

1

0 25

0 25
5/5/2005 GBH

Photocopies

18

2 7o

0 15
6/2/2005 GBH

Long Distance Charges

1

0 U

0 13
Total costs

$34 103 56

